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Abstract
This historical monograph addresses a gap in the extensive scholarly research 
literature devoted to comparative advertising—especially that which contrasts the 
advertised product, service, or brand with an identifiable competitor—by exploring 
advertisers’ explanations for its appeal as a tactic throughout the previous century. 
Prior historical research confirms advertisers have long been aware of and greatly 
concerned about the unintended consequences of what they often called excessively 
competitive and combative advertising. Moreover, despite some thirty-five years of 
systematic scholarly research, two research teams recently concluded that the state 
of empirical knowledge regarding its effectiveness remains “equivocal.” By synthesizing 
the extensive theoretical and empirical research literature on comparative advertising 
and interpreting those findings from a historical perspective, this monograph offers 
uniquely significant insights into modern advertising’s history, theory, and practice.
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Comparative advertising—especially that which contrasts the advertised product or 
service with an identifiable competitor—has been a controversial topic among adver-
tisers throughout the past one hundred years and remains so. Recent historical research 
suggests that such consequences as the tendency for advertisers to lose focus on their 
own message strategies, the creation of potentially misleading advertisements, legal 
challenges from competitors under the Lanham Trademark Act, and damage to adver-
tising’s institutional veracity have often occurred when advertisers used comparative 
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advertising, especially if they became engaged in advertising wars.1 Moreover, and 
despite some thirty-five years of systematic scholarly research, two independent 
research teams concluded not long ago that the state of empirical knowledge regarding 
its effectiveness remains “equivocal.”2
Industry concerns regarding comparative advertising and calls for its reform began 
to appear regularly during the Great Depression and peaked during one of the most 
contentious periods of advertising self-regulation, the 1970s. Comparative advertis-
ing, in fact, set the stage for an extraordinary regulatory battle between the advertising 
industry and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission (FTC) during the mid- to late-1970s. 
Advertisers were aware of and concerned about the unintended consequences of what 
they sometimes called excessively competitive and combative advertising throughout 
the previous century.3 These consequences help explain why surveys of contemporary 
advertising professionals confirm that despite its frequent use, they continue to retain 
a healthy skepticism toward comparative advertising’s effectiveness.4
Problems with comparative advertising also attracted the attention of media owners 
and managers. By the early-1930s, they were in near-unanimous agreement that com-
parative advertising represented a serious business and regulatory problem, trapping 
many between two or more feuding patrons, frequently forcing advertising refusals 
and revisions to clearance policies, and threatening advertising revenue.5
Although comparative advertising was widely criticized by advertisers during the 
first half of the twentieth century, research confirms they did engage in it, especially 
during the lean years of the Great Depression.6 Richard Pollay,7 who content analyzed 
2,000 magazine ads published between 1900 and 1980, reported that the generalized 
mention of competitive standing, or what is called “implied” comparative advertis-
ing,8 was quite common, with an average of 25% across the decades. However, when 
Pollay operationalized comparative advertising as ads that included “clues” to the 
identity of competitors, or what is called “explicit” comparative advertising,9 the aver-
age was only 2%. Pollay found the greatest frequency of use, at 4%, in the 1970s.
Other researchers also report that explicit comparative advertising increased sig-
nificantly during and after the 1970s in both broadcast and print media. Estimates of 
comparative ads as a percentage of all ads in the United States range from about 7%10 
to 23%11 to between 30% and 40%.12 Researchers Linda Swayne and Thomas 
Stevenson found the percentage of comparative ads in business magazines increased 
from 8.1% in 1970 to 23.8% in 1985,13 and Fahad Al-Olayan and Kiran Karande 
report that 26% of their sample of U.S. general interest, family, and women’s maga-
zines included comparisons.14
Estimates of the use of comparative advertising on television are higher, on aver-
age, ranging from 5% to 10%15 to 14%16 to 50%17 to as high as 80%.18 Industry reports 
of comparative advertising frequency based on television network analyses also indi-
cate a steady increase, ranging from 23%19 to 35%20 to as high as 50%.21 The number 
of comparative commercials on prime time television, according to Gallup & Robinson, 
soared from one out of thirty during the 1973 season to one out of twelve in 1975.22 
Although there has been no recent content analysis of comparative advertising use, 
some industry observers suggest an increase during the first decade of the twentieth 
century.23
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There are several theoretical explanations for why the kinds of negative informa-
tion often found in comparative ads could enhance their effectiveness. For instance, 
“negativity bias”24 predicts that negative information may have a greater effect in the 
decision-making process, compared with positive information. Researchers investi-
gating political attack advertising propose this occurs because negative information is 
more unexpected and novel,25 less ambiguous,26 and more credible.27 Some of these 
effects likely occur because negative information is often presented, as it generally is 
in comparative product and service advertising, within a context that is predominantly 
positive.28 On the other hand, others suggest negative information encourages greater 
attention and recall because it appeals to emotion rather than logic29 and because peo-
ple assign greater weight to negative information when making evaluations in social 
settings.30
Advertising’s most important theory, the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM),31 
also offers a valuable framework for understanding comparative advertising and its 
effectiveness. The ELM proposes two routes to persuasion—one central and one 
peripheral. The central route predicts that when people are motivated to think about a 
message (e.g., they are highly involved or the message is especially relevant) and able 
to think about it (e.g., the message is fairly easy to understand), then they will cogni-
tively elaborate on the claims in the ad and be persuaded by issue-relevant arguments.
Negativity bias suggests that comparative ads containing claims and criticisms 
about competitors, especially identified ones, likely activate the central route to per-
suasion, encouraging people to integrate the claims into their existing knowledge 
structures, leading to message acceptance and possibly long-term attitude change. On 
the other hand, since some people may be expected to counterargue with comparative 
ads as well as derogate the source,32 these could encourage negative thoughts, leading 
to rejection of the message. Conversely, the “distraction hypothesis”33 predicts that 
after a comparative ad gains people’s attention, they might be distracted from counter-
arguing with the comparative claims and criticisms by peripheral cues, such as humor, 
music, or celebrity spokespersons. The result would be a weaker, temporary form of 
attitude change by way of the ELM’s peripheral route to persuasion.
Academic researchers have devoted considerable attention to comparative advertis-
ing. More than eighty studies on the topic were published in scholarly journals between 
1975 and 1994.34 Many of these were likely among the seventy-seven studies Dhruv 
Grewal and his colleagues included in their widely cited meta-analysis.35 A search of 
the literature published since 1997 uncovered another fifty studies of comparative 
advertising.
A review and synthesis of the findings and conclusions from Grewal et al.’s meta-
analysis, John Rogers and Terrell Williams’s practitioner survey and literature review 
(forty-two studies), Fred Beard’s 2011 update of the Rogers and Williams survey, and 
the fifty studies of comparative advertising published since 1997 is presented in Table 1’s 
model.36 The model’s process outcomes (cognitive, affective, and conative) were cho-
sen from the literature based on three criteria: (1) They are the outcomes most fre-
quently investigated, (2) they are of theoretical significance, and (3) they are important 
to advertisers.
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Advertisers recognize that attention to an ad explains only part of its effectiveness. 
Consumers must also process some of the information cognitively and be able to recall 
it later. Based on their review of the research literature, Rogers and Williams con-
cluded that comparative, versus noncomparative, advertising increases not only mes-
sage recall but also counterargument and source derogation. Conversely, they 
concluded that its effects on informativeness and claim/message believability are 
likely negative. Grewal and his colleagues similarly concluded that comparative ads 
generate more attention, encourage greater message processing, and increase brand-
name recall. Although they also concluded that comparative ads generate lower levels 
of source credibility, they did not find a significant effect on ad, or message, believ-
ability nor on informativeness.
Rogers and Williams’s survey of advertising creative executives representing the 
top 500 U.S. agencies and Beard’s recent replication both report that respondents 
agreed comparative advertising is relatively more effective than noncomparative 
advertising for achieving recall of message claims and brand attributes, that they 
encourage greater ad interest, and that their claims and messages are more believable. 
Conversely, creative practitioners disagreed that comparative ads are more effective at 
achieving brand-name recall. The differences regarding whether comparative adver-
tising is more informative than noncomparative advertising for both studies were not 
significant.
Table 1. Comparative versus Noncomparative Advertising–Process Outcomes and 
Situational Factors.
Comparative
versus
Noncomparative Advertising
Cognitive
Ad Attention (+)
Ad Interest (+)
Message Recall (+)
Message Processing (+)
Informativeness (–)
Brand-Name Recall (*)
Claim/Message Believability (*)
Source Derogation (+)
Counterarguing (+)
Affective
A
ad
 (–)
A
br
 (*)
Brand Loyalty (–)
Conative
P
i
 (+)
Initial Brand Trial (+)
Encourage Repeat Purchase (–)
Situational Factors
Advertised Brand: Small Market Share (+)
Brand is New (+)
Advertised Brand: Large Market Share (–)
Advertised Brand is of High Quality (+)
Claims are Well Substantiated (+)
Claims Made on Salient Benefits (+)
Claims are Believable (+)
Ads are More Creative (+)
Degree of Negativity (–)
Note: + = positive effect,  = negative effect, * = inconclusive.
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Only one recent study reported the effects of comparative versus noncomparative 
advertising on message recall. Researcher Naveen Donthu found that both unaided 
and aided recall were significantly greater for a comparative ad.37 The authors of two 
other recent studies report comparative ads and their claims were significantly more 
believable than noncomparative ads, although ads in both studies were “partly” com-
parative (i.e., they contained both comparative and noncomparative information).38
Affective process outcomes capture how advertising encourages favorable feelings 
toward an advertisement or a sponsored brand. Based on their review of the literature, 
Rogers and Williams concluded that researchers had failed to identify either a positive 
or negative effect of comparative, versus noncomparative, advertising on attitude 
toward the ad (Aad) or attitude toward the brand (Abr). Grewal and his colleagues con-
cluded that comparative ads generate more negative Aad than noncomparative ones; 
conversely, they concluded that they generate more favorable Abr.
Rogers and Williams, and Beard report that advertising creative executives believe 
comparative advertising is less effective than noncomparative advertising for achiev-
ing both Aad and Abr. The majority of respondents to both surveys also agreed that 
comparative ads likely have a negative effect on brand loyalty, compared with non-
comparative ads.
Findings from six recent studies investigating the effects of comparative versus 
noncomparative ads on Aad were evenly split between those finding a significant nega-
tive effect39 and those reporting nonsignificant differences.40 Six recent studies have 
measured the effects of a comparative versus noncomparative ad on Abr, with four 
reporting nonsignificant differences41 and two reporting significant positive 
differences.42
Conative process outcomes and advertising objectives capture how advertising can 
encourage desire among consumers for a product or brand and affect the ultimate deci-
sion to purchase it. Rogers and Williams, based on their review, concluded that 
researchers had failed to identify either a positive or negative effect of comparative, 
versus noncomparative, advertising on either purchase intention (Pi) or initial brand 
trial. Grewal et al., on the other hand, report that comparative ads increase both Pi and 
initial brand trial more than noncomparative ads. Rogers and Williams, and Beard 
similarly report that creative executives agree that comparative advertising is more 
effective than noncomparative advertising for achieving Pi and initial brand trial, but 
less effective for encouraging repeat purchase.
Since 1997, five works have appeared reporting the direct effects of comparative 
versus noncomparative advertising on Pi, with three reporting nonsignificant differ-
ences43 and two reporting positive findings in favor of comparative advertising.44
In summary, support for overall conclusions is limited by absent and occasionally 
contradictory findings among the three literature reviews and two surveys. However, 
as shown in Table 1, direct effects of comparative versus noncomparative advertising 
on advertising outcomes and for which there are no directly contradictory findings 
include its likely positive effects on ad attention, ad interest, message recall, message 
processing, counterargument, source derogation, Pi, and initial brand trial. Negative 
effects for which there are multiple supporting findings and no contradictory ones 
include informativeness, Aad, brand loyalty, and repeat purchase. For at least three 
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important outcomes—brand-name recall, claim/message believability, and Abr—the 
direct effects of comparative advertising remain substantially in question.
Grewal and his colleagues also analyzed multiple research findings for several 
moderators of comparative advertising effects, which Rogers and Williams, and Beard 
refer to as “situational factors.”45 A search of the literature published between 1998 
and 2012 revealed twenty-nine studies investigating twenty-eight moderators and 
mediators. However, none reported findings for how the main effect of comparative 
advertising varied by a one-way interaction with any of the moderators previously 
investigated. Thus, the findings from these studies were not included in Table 1’s 
model.
Grewal et al. concluded that comparative versus noncomparative advertising is 
more effective when the advertised brand has a small market share, for brands new to 
the market, and when claims are well substantiated. They concluded that it is less 
effective when the brand has a large market share. In addition, they also investigated 
the effects of credibility enhancers (e.g., the use of credible sources, two-sided mes-
sages, or the support of claims with factual information). Although they concluded 
that the use of credibility enhancers does not enhance message awareness nor increase 
ad believability, they did find that enhancing the credibility of comparative ads leads 
to more favorable Abr and greater Pi.
Rogers and Williams, and Beard reported that creative practitioners agree that com-
parative advertising is relatively more effective than noncomparative advertising 
when the advertised brand has a small market share, if claims are made on salient 
product benefits, if claims are well substantiated, if claims are believable, if ads are 
more creative, and if the advertised brand is of higher quality. They agreed that com-
parative advertising is less effective when the advertised brand has a large market 
share.
Although neither Rogers and Williams nor Beard directly questioned their respon-
dents about the degree of negativity in the execution of comparative ads, the factor did 
emerge in Beard’s thematic analysis of responses to an open-ended item on his ques-
tionnaire. He reported that some creative executives clearly held the view that deni-
grating or attacking a competitor can reflect negatively on the advertised brand, that it 
is important that comparative ads not be perceived as especially mean-spirited, and 
that their effectiveness critically depends on their tone. The findings of one of the only 
studies to directly compare high versus low negativity in comparative advertising con-
firmed that a high-negativity comparative ad scored significantly lower on measures 
of believability, fairness of content, approval of content, informativeness, and overall 
ad evaluation.46
In summary, comparisons across the literature’s findings and conclusions 
show that comparative advertising is likely more effective than noncomparative 
advertising under all the situational factors summarized in Table 1, with the 
exceptions of advertising on behalf of products or services with large market 
shares and comparative advertising that is perceived by consumers to be exces-
sively negative.
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Research Purpose and Significance of This Monograph
By synthesizing the theoretical and empirical research literature on comparative 
advertising and interpreting those findings from a historical perspective, this mono-
graph offers unique insights into modern advertising’s history, theory, and practice. 
The study’s findings reveal (1) the most important events, participants, and examples 
in the history of one of modern advertising’s most controversial tactics; (2) for what 
purposes advertisers believed comparative advertising would be more effective than 
noncomparative advertising, why, and how these beliefs may have changed over time; 
(3) the extent to which the views, practices, and experiences of advertisers as revealed 
in their trade publications are consistent with the findings of decades of theory devel-
opment, empirical academic research, and practitioner surveys; and (4) additional 
explanatory insights into the research literature’s findings and conclusions.
Historical Method
Sources for this historical study consist of more than 650 articles published in adver-
tising, marketing, media, and general business trade journals between 1900 and 2012. 
Trade journals have proven valuable for previous important historical studies of adver-
tising (e.g., Merle Curti’s 1967 work47). Since no index of business publications was 
available prior to 1913, sources for the earliest period were located by scanning one 
randomly selected issue from each of the sixty volumes of the industry’s most influen-
tial trade journal, Printers’ Ink, published between 1900 and 1913 (consisting of 
approximately 780 issues). Any articles that addressed the topic of comparative adver-
tising in any manner were included as potential data.
The search for sources for the remainder of the twentieth century through the pres-
ent day was conducted using four business periodical indices: the Industrial Arts Index 
(1913–1957), the Business Periodicals Index (1958–1973), the ABI/Inform Complete 
database (1971–2012), and the Business Source Premier database (1984–2012). The 
Industrial Arts Index is the only business periodical index available for the period it 
covers; it continued in 1958 as the Business Periodicals Index. When primary sources 
obtained in this manner pointed to the existence of other sources, these, too, were col-
lected and added to the body of data.
Table 1’s model of comparative advertising effects and moderators was then 
used as a thematic framework for the analysis of the historical data. These thematic 
categories—comparative advertising’s direct effects on process outcomes and vari-
ous situational factors (i.e., moderators) of those effects—were applied to the data 
deductively in a search for specific data that confirmed or disconfirmed the themes 
and that helped explain them. Other themes, however, were also allowed to emerge 
from the data in an inductive, qualitative fashion.
The periodization scheme48 was established a priori and is similar to those used for 
other advertising histories and for similar reasons.49 What is considered “modern” 
advertising emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century50 and steadily progressed 
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in its sophistication and the professionalism of its practitioners throughout the 1900s, 
1910s, and 1920s. The Great Depression of the 1930s and the war years of the 1940s, 
however, severely affected advertising spending, message strategy, and the tactical 
execution of advertisements. Prior research also shows that problems with compara-
tive advertising began attracting the attention of advertisers, media executives and 
managers, and federal regulators during the 1930s.51 The 1950s capture the tremen-
dous postwar boom in advertising spending as well as the beginning of advertising’s 
“Golden Age.”
The 1960s and 1970s are especially important, and analyzed as a single period, 
because U.S. advertisers began naming competitors more frequently in the early-1960s 
and comparative advertising began in earnest at the outset of the 1970s. The 1960s to 
1970s are also important because they include the industry’s much vaunted “Creative 
Revolution.” The final three decades are analyzed as a single period for two reasons. 
First, by 1980, comparative advertising had become both accepted and widely practiced 
among mainstream advertisers. Second, the event that distinguishes this period from 
the one that precedes it literally occurred on a single day. On August 13, 1979, the FTC 
published a definitive restatement of its comparative advertising policy, declaring 
beyond question that trade association codes, media clearance policies, and advertising 
self-regulatory rules restricting comparative advertising would not be tolerated. This 
event likely contributed substantially to what appears to be the more widespread use of 
explicit comparative advertising among mainstream advertisers since then.
The method employed for this history lacks the appraisals of validity and reliability 
that quantitative content analysis possesses. In fact, the debate among historians over 
qualitative versus quantitative methods has often been quite contentious.52 It is, how-
ever, consistent with the methods of empirical historical research. Defined by historian 
David Fischer, an empirical historian is one “who asks an open-ended question about 
past events and answers it with selected facts that are arranged in the form of an 
explanatory paradigm.”53 As Smith elaborates, “The explanatory paradigm, of course, 
takes different forms—narrative, statistical explanation—but always consists of a rea-
soned, systematic examination of surviving recorded happenings, written in a spirit of 
critical inquiry seeking the whole truth.”54
The 1900s to 1920s
Richard Pollay found that while it was not uncommon for advertisers to mention com-
petitive standing in a general way during this period (i.e., implied comparative adver-
tising), magazine advertisers rarely mentioned a competitor by name, with only 2% 
and 1% of ads in the 1900s and 1910s, and none in the 1920s.55 Thus, it is not surpris-
ing to find that most advertisers at the turn of the last century held predominantly 
negative views toward comparative advertising, or what they often referred to as 
“knocking” or “unselling,” as in the unselling of a competitor’s merchandise rather 
than the selling of one’s own.
The mention of a competitor was often associated with the frequently dishonest and 
professionally embarrassing “buncombe, bombast, and ballyhoo” advertising of the 
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mid- to late-1800s. The views of the majority of advertisers during this period are 
summarized well by the author of a piece in Printers’ Ink: “Hasn’t the day passed in 
advertisements or elsewhere for attacks upon competitors’ goods, whether direct or 
indirect?”56 Such views were predominant well into the 1920s, and most sources sug-
gest that the use of comparative advertising remained infrequent: “Mention of com-
petitors’ names in advertising is sufficiently unusual to make those announcements 
noteworthy.”57 Another Printers’ Ink author admonished advertisers: “Consider for 
example that Eleventh Commandment of the advertising man: ‘Thou shalt not knock 
thy competitor’s goods.’”58
However, and despite the mainly negative views toward comparative advertising, 
sources confirmed it was not totally absent from the advertising of the period, and that 
it was often quite negative in tone. As Printers’ Ink observed,
The garden variety of “knocking argument” is in bad odor everywhere—holding the nose 
when a competitor’s name is mentioned—and though it is still in fairly general use by gyp 
concerns and guerrilla salesmen, it is proscribed by the “regulars” in all lines.59
San Francisco ad agency president Emil Brisacher also suggested that use of the 
tactic was becoming quite prevalent toward the end of the 1920s, even before the Wall 
Street Crash of November 1929, and that many continued to view it as unseemly. As 
Brisacher wrote, “It is really amazing to see how widespread this epithet-throwing 
contest has become. It is indulged in by so many advertisers generally thought to have 
spotless advertising reputations.”60
Direct Effects
Cognitive outcomes. Advertisers and industry observers wrote little about the effective-
ness of comparative advertising during the first three decades of the twentieth century, 
consistent with a dearth of favorable views toward the tactic. However, during the 
mid- to late-1920s, they began to discuss its likely effects with greater frequency. 
Among the first beliefs to emerge was that comparative advertising directly affects the 
cognitive outcomes of attention and awareness. Referring to frequent discussions of 
the subject of “knocking” copy in the journal’s pages, a Printers’ Ink contributor 
observed the following: “The majority of these articles advanced the claim that nega-
tive advertising is a dangerous copy tool. Apparently, however, many copy writers 
believe that negative copy is ‘interrupting’ rather than alarming.”61
Another view to emerge was the belief that while comparative ads might create 
attention and awareness for the advertiser, they would benefit the competitor as well. 
As suggested by Printers’ Ink in an editorial devoted to an ad that mentioned and 
complimented the advertiser’s competitor,
Taking space in an advertisement to compliment a competitor on his advertising is an 
occurrence rare enough to take time out for a moment’s reflection. . . . One danger which a 
compliment shares with a knock is that of informing the ignorant of the existence of the 
competitor.62
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A comparative campaign that received considerable attention during the late-1920s 
was George Washington Hill’s infamous “Reach for a Lucky instead of a Sweet” cam-
paign (see Figure 1). As the editor of the Confectioners Journal, and vocal critic of the 
campaign and its supposed attack on the candy and confections industry, reported, 
“Mr. Hill, of American Tobacco, has told me, and I am certain that he believes it, that 
such attacks increase the consumption of the product attacked.”63
Only a single observer during this period argued that comparative campaigns, such 
as the “Reach for a Lucky” campaign, would be informative. As he proposed,
Such advertising brings out values in products that have never been generally known. This 
type of sales effort helps to make the public the real arbiter of what it shall buy; and, if 
properly weighed, tends to raise the level of intelligence upon which demand and consumption 
are based.64
As one might expect, given the lack of enthusiasm for comparative advertising, the 
majority of advertisers’ views regarding its believability were negative. At the outset 
of the century, this view was captured well in a Printers’ Ink reprint from the Southern 
Drug Journal:
If you must talk about your competitor, it is better for you to speak well of him than ill. . . . 
If you try to “run him down” people will not only not believe what you say, but will think 
that he is taking your trade away from you by offering some superior inducements.65
Printers’ Ink summarized this view again at the end of the period, strongly suggest-
ing that the lack of believability was linked to comparative advertising that knocked, 
or directly criticized, competitors: “A knock has doubtful merit. The general effect, 
where a knock does not actually antagonize, is to make the prospect suspicious.”66
Other sources linked their views regarding comparative advertising’s lack of 
believability to two comparative tactics that garnered substantial discussion and fre-
quent criticism throughout this period—those of implying or explicitly claiming that 
all the advertiser’s competitors were dishonest in their advertising or that everyone 
else’s products were inferior. A Printers’ Ink author summarized this view: “Isn’t the 
public suspicious of sweeping claims of superiority and allegations that no one except 
the advertiser himself should be credited with common honesty?”67 Another Printers’ 
Ink contributor expressed the identical belief some seventeen years later:
Here’s another advertiser, who starts off with the headline, “Why Gamble with ----------?” 
and goes on to imply that that is precisely what anybody is doing who buys any other product 
than his own. Speaking as one who doesn’t know much about that particular article, I 
announce that I don’t believe it; and what is more, I don’t believe the men who really do 
know a lot about it, believe it either.68
Conversely, an industry observer offered a more favorable observation regarding 
the believability of a sweeping comparative claim of superiority, but specifically one 
combined with a money-back guarantee (see Figure 2). As he concluded,
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Figure 1. “I smoke a Lucky instead of eating sweets.”
Source: The New York Times, October 23, 1928, 22. Lucky Strike is a registered trademark of Reynolds 
Innovations Inc. Corporation.
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The only inference possible to be drawn is the one which the advertiser obviously expects 
that newspaper readers will draw—namely that unless Angus Watson believed its product 
certain to beat all other brands, it would be foolish to make this offer.69
In addition to concerns about the believability of comparative advertising with 
regard to advertisers and their products, the comments of a Printers’ Ink contributor 
acknowledged the possibility that comparative claims could produce negative conse-
quences for all the competitors in the category as well as advertising as an institution. 
As he wrote,
If Advertiser A makes a certain statement of a positive sort and Advertiser B comes along 
with an equally strong statement, then both can’t be telling the truth. Advertising is placed, 
therefore, under a shadow, in a sense. When an advertiser states in his advertising that “most 
other products of this type” have grievous faults, sometimes positively serious, to what 
extent does he damage both his worthy competitors and the cause of advertising in general?70
Figure 2. “My lady states her claim.”
Source: Printers’ Ink, October 6, 1927, 10.
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Affective outcomes. Although sources during this period had little to say about affec-
tive outcomes, those that did speculate about whether comparative ads encourage 
liking for sponsors or the ads themselves overwhelmingly agreed that comparative 
advertising would likely cause negative responses. As Printers’ Ink concluded in 
its description of a comparative ad, “It certainly looks like a case of ‘sour grapes,’ 
whether it is or not, when a concern devotes an entire ad to talk about competi-
tors.”71 Another contributor captured the beliefs of many when he wrote the 
following:
But in nine cases out of ten, a salesman hurts his cause by being drawn into an argument as 
to whether a competitor’s line is as good as his own. It puts him at the disadvantage of being 
on the defensive.72
San Francisco adman Emil Brisacher declared some twenty years later, “Comparisons 
are always odious—but in advertising space they are costly—they lose sales and they 
lessen the prestige of the advertiser who makes them.”73
Conversely, a small minority proposed that comparative ads could reflect posi-
tively on their sponsors, but each of these views was also associated with the belief 
that this was only true if the advertising’s tone were positive. At the outset of the 
century, this belief was captured well by Printers’ Ink: “If you speak well of him [the 
competitor] it will indicate that you have so much confidence in your own goods and 
methods that you are not afraid of a little competition.”74 The identical belief was 
expressed in a discussion of the comparative ad shown in Figure 3. As the author 
explained,
Printers’ Ink has hitherto called attention to advertisements that contained friendly references 
to competitors, and attacks on competitors by name have occasionally been seen on both 
sides of the Atlantic. To be able to name a competitor in the way which the Dunlop company 
adopts is assuredly a sign of strength.75
On the other hand, a single source during this period mentioned the possibility that 
a comparative ad might encourage negative attitudes toward the sponsored brand and 
favorable ones toward the comparison brand by way of backlash. As he proposed, 
“Isn’t it human nature to take the part of the underdog and to resent a holier-than-thou 
attitude?”76
Conative outcomes. During this period, the majority of advertisers and industry observ-
ers agreed that the conative effects of comparative advertising and the profitability 
resulting from them would be poor. One Printers’ Ink writer seemed to speak for many 
when he wrote the following: “There is no need to refrain from attacking a competitor, 
directly or indirectly, on ethical grounds. It is enough if you once get it clearly in your 
head that it doesn’t pay you.”77 As another pointed out with regard to George Washing-
ton Hill’s apparent attack on the sweets industry and other advertisers who followed 
his example,
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Figure 3. “Does it say ‘Made in England’ on your tyres?”
Source: Printers’ Ink, September 13, 1923, 8. Dunlop is a registered trademark of DNA (Housemarks) 
Limited.
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Somewhere, some day, will come a point where everybody will realize that if all the money 
all these industries spend on their mock battles could be quietly invested in the unexciting 
process of simple direct selling of better goods at lower prices everybody would make more 
money.78
However, this was not the only view to find expression during this period, and 
specifically with regard to Hill’s Reach for a Lucky campaign. The majority of the 
sources that discussed the campaign and its sales effects, including, especially, Hill 
himself, pointed to the tremendous increase in both sales of and market share for 
Luckies that occurred during the campaign. As critic of the campaign Eugene Pharo 
explained, “The American Tobacco Company has brought forward only one reason 
for adopting offensive advertising tactics. It has been that such tactics have increased 
the sale of its product.”79 Many historical and contemporary sources do, in fact, affirm 
the success of Hill and his Luckies brand during this period.80
Some contributors to the minority belief that comparative advertising could encour-
age sales directly also acknowledged the possibility that it would sell the competitor’s 
product. A Printers’ Ink author captured this view, when he wrote the following: “‘It’s 
clever stuff and good advertising, but it will sell the other fellow’s line as well as it will 
sell your own,’ is a popular phrase, not without some foundation of truth.”81 As George 
Washington Hill told critic Eugene Pharo, regarding his Reach for a Lucky campaign, 
“Without its being at all intentional on our part, the calling of attention to the sweets 
industries, by means of our pocketbook, has, paradoxically, resulted in an enormously 
increased consumption of sweets.”82
The belief that comparative advertising could lead to problems for entire industries 
found expression during this period. With regard to an extraordinarily vicious adver-
tising war between Calumet baking powder and other brands marketed by a “trust,” 
which included the equally popular Royal brand (see Figure 4, for an example), a 
Printers’ Ink author noted,
Can one be blamed if the suspicion gets around, and gathers force with the passage of years, 
that all baking powders are bad, and that the less one uses any of them the better it will be for 
his health. . . . What can such a condition be laid to except this persistent campaign of attack 
and counterattack?83
The mutually damaging consequences of this war were still being discussed nearly 
twenty years later in the pages of Printers’ Ink:
Lots of people still alive and well can vividly recall the days of some years ago when they 
were repeatedly warned to beware of “benzoate of soda.” Some folks even ceased to eat, for 
a while, fearing all their food was poisoned.84
Situational Factors
There were few explanations for what situational factors might contribute to the effec-
tiveness of comparative advertising during the first three decades of the twentieth 
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century, probably because so few advertisers had anything favorable to say about it. 
The suggestions that do appear are offered in a mainly cynical fashion and reflect the 
tendency of the period for comparative advertisers to create implied comparative ads 
that claimed superiority over all their competitors. As summarized by Printers’ Ink,
Really, though there is only one method. You teach readers to view the other fellow with 
alarm. Nobody ever points a finger directly at him—Oh, dear, no! But a broad-minded, 
altruistic concern for the welfare of mankind leads you to expose some of the dark deceptions 
of your industry.85
Only one reference was made during this period as to what might contribute to the 
effectiveness of a comparative ad and claim. One of the few advertisers to advocate 
the approach, in an open forum on the topic, clearly expressed the view that well-
substantiated comparative claims made about a product of superior quality would be 
believable and effective. As he declared, “Gentlemen, what better and more convincing 
Figure 4. “The Baking Powder Story in a nut-shell.”
Source: Printers’ Ink, June 9, 1910, 23. Calumet is a registered trademark of Kraft Foods Global Brands LLC.
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campaign arguments can I possibly assemble than that I build my product with the 
greatest possible care, out of the best materials, and that my competitors do not?”86 
Conversely, the view that comparative knocks directed toward one or more com-
petitors would fail to communicate a salient consumer benefit or be persuasive was 
strongly implied by this critic:
You don’t see Westinghouse or General Electric or the leading machine tool advertisers, or any 
of the other really successful industrial people wasting any time or attention on invidious 
comparisons with the other fellow’s goods, whether he is named or otherwise identified, or not. 
That isn’t merely a question of ethics, or of taste; it isn’t even due to the fact that they know the 
products of their real competitors are good products, too—although they do know that. It is just 
simply due to the fact that they know they have a job to do—to sell their own stuff.87
A view that would contribute to substantial conflict over comparative advertising 
during the 1960s and 1970s emerged for the first time during this period. This was the 
belief that any reference to competitors, even indirectly, should be considered synony-
mous with disparagement. Included in Joseph Appel’s “Ten Commandments of 
Advertising” speech at the 1911 Associated Advertising Clubs of America (AACA) 
convention were the following relevant admonitions: “Thou shalt not covet, nor imi-
tate, nor run down thy neighbor’s business; thou shalt not covet, nor imitate, nor run 
down thy neighbor’s name, nor fame, nor his wares, nor his trade-mark, nor anything 
that is thy neighbor’s.”88 One of modern advertising’s most influential early practitio-
ners, Appel, at the time, was advertising manager for John Wanamaker’s department 
stores and president of the AACA’s (forerunner of today’s American Advertising 
Federation) retail advertisers’ division.
George Washington Hill’s explanation at the end of the period for the candy and 
confectioner industry’s angry response to his Reach for a Lucky campaign also illus-
trates the view that merely mentioning competitors was synonymous with disparage-
ment. “They call it ‘unfair’ and ‘disparaging,’ and they tell us that in mentioning 
sweets in our advertising we are doing an ‘unethical’ thing,” Hill told Sales Management 
and Advertisers’ Weekly. “They tell us it isn’t right to speak disparagingly of others in 
one’s advertising.”89
The 1930s to 1950s
Richard Pollay found that the use of implied comparative ads was a common tactic during 
this period, at 22%, 26%, and 37% of his sample of magazine ads from the 1930s, 1940s, 
and 1950s, respectively.90 Direct comparisons with identified competitors were used 
rarely in magazine ads of this period. However, prior historical research on comparative 
advertising and competition in advertising91 strongly suggests that many advertisers 
began ignoring Claude Hopkins’s admonition—“Rule 1 in all salesmanship courses I 
have studied is: Never attack a competitor”—at the outset of the Great Depression.92
Responding to a request for examples of “fighting copy” or advertising that “makes 
direct or indirect statements regarding the merit of the advertiser’s type of product as 
compared with other types that compete for the same market,” Printers’ Ink replied,
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A history of advertising would tell more war-stories than ever were swapped at a G.A.R. 
[Grand Army of the Republic, a U.S. civil war fraternal organization] encampment. In 
advertising space there have been wars over soap, wars over shoes, wars over automobiles, 
wars over tires, wars over gasoline, wars over most of the products that manufacturers 
produce and sell.93
The term comparative advertising, in fact, appeared in the literature for the first 
time at the beginning of this period, as opposed to knocking, competitive advertising, 
or unselling.94
The period also produced what is widely considered to be a watershed example, 
both then and now—adman J. Sterling Getchell’s “Look at All Three” for Plymouth. 
Author Julian L. Watkins devoted a chapter to this ad in his book, The One Hundred 
Greatest Advertisements: Who Wrote Them and What They Did.95 President of agency 
Cunningham & Walsh Inc. Anthony Chevins referred to the ad as “what may be the 
grand-daddy of all specific comparative ads.”96 A follow-up ad published a few weeks 
after the original is shown in Figure 5 and clearly suggests its effectiveness.
Direct Effects
Cognitive outcomes. The belief that comparative advertising successfully attracts atten-
tion was mentioned frequently during this period. This view was summarized, and 
endorsed somewhat, by advertising pioneer Claude Hopkins:
My friend had Irish parents, while mine were Scotch. So, while we agree on the love of 
advertising, we do not always agree on policies. Jim rather loves a fight. . . . Jim says, “Do 
something out of the ordinary. Stir people up. A single prize fight brought more revenue than 
Romeo and Juliet since the day it was written.” I follow him to some extent.97
Referring to comparative advertising by Ford auto dealers, Printers’ Ink observed, 
“The advertising is being talked about, which means the Ford is being talked about, 
and that is something that Mr. Ford always encourages.”98 The description of a histori-
cally significant episode and comparative campaign some twenty-five years later also 
shows that it was believed to have created significant attention and recall, and Printers’ 
Ink cited research to prove it. Appliance manufacturer Westinghouse’s “Sand Test” 
was reported to have “turned up by accident” but was initially ignored by Westinghouse 
ad agency McCann-Erickson because it was deemed “too daring.”99
One of the first product demonstrations ever televised live, the sand test was con-
ducted by actress and Westinghouse spokeswoman Betty Furness under the oversight 
of the New York Federation of Women’s Clubs. It aired on September 24, 1957, dur-
ing a broadcast of network CBS’s “Studio One.” Two cups of sand were added to the 
loads in a Westinghouse washer and those of three unidentified competitors (brands 
“X,” “Y,” and “Z”). At the end of the program, a white-glove inspection revealed that 
only the Westinghouse held no residual sand. Figures 6 and 7 show still images from 
the groundbreaking commercial and a print execution from the campaign, the latter 
featuring a Marine Corps sergeant, who performed the white-glove test. Printers’ Ink 
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Figure 5. “Thank you, folks!”
Source: The Washington Post, April 24, 1932, 8. Plymouth is a registered trademark of Chrysler Group LLC.
associate editor Sarah Lee Gerrish reported that a second version of the sand test—
broadcast live three weeks later because many viewers wrote to CBS, complaining that 
the first test must have been “rigged”—generated significant attention and recall: 
“Gallup-Robinson reported that it had an 88% recall response. No previous laundry-
equipment commercial rated by G-R had ever scored higher than 40%.”100
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Figure 6. Westinghouse “Sand Test” (television).
Source: http://www.dailymotion.com. Westinghouse is a registered trademark of Westinghouse Electric 
Corporation.
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Figure 7. Westinghouse “Sand Test” (print).
Source: Printers’ Ink, March 29, 1957, 57.
Some contributors on the topic of attention, while acknowledging that comparative 
advertising would likely encourage it, also questioned its value. As Claude Hopkins 
wrote in his critique of an attack on George Washington Hill by R. J. Reynolds on 
behalf of the company’s Camel brand,
We agree that we must get attention. But we don’t go out on the street and turn somersaults. 
We don’t engage in a brawl. We don’t wear a fool’s cap, a great coat and red shoes. That is 
not the attention we want.101
Paul Hollister, publicity director for R. H. Macy & Company, described his belief 
that the excessively belligerent comparative advertising of the early-1930s was moti-
vated by the Depression-era desperation. Hollister also argued that the kind of atten-
tion comparative ads encouraged would contribute little to any legitimate advertising 
outcomes:
And in the past few years, those elders and betters of ours, the national advertisers, have been 
reaching for wider and heavier custard pies to throw at each other; they have filled the air 
with so much acrimony that they’ve come almost to believing themselves that they hate each 
other; they have wholly lost sight of the fact that the consumer—their consumer and ours—
frankly doesn’t give a whoop. . . . The public is well-bred; it may stop to watch a fight, but 
it will then go on about its business.102
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The belief that comparative advertising creates awareness for the comparison product 
or service continued during this period and was held by a majority. One advertising agency 
executive made this point when describing a client who did not respond to comparative 
attacks with his own because he believed he was benefiting from them. As he wrote,
His first reaction was to make answer. But after gathering information on which to base his 
retort he came to the conclusion that to use it would be to repeat the error. His product, as he 
saw the situation, was being advertised by competitors.103
And as Aesop Glim—Printers’ Ink columnist George Laflin Miller—warned com-
parative advertisers some seventeen years later, “In a left-handed way, you are inviting 
some of your prospects . . . to look into your competitor’s proposition.”104
At the outset of this period, many sources began expressing the belief that compara-
tive advertising could be informative. In reference to an ongoing comparative adver-
tising war among replacement tire manufacturers and merchandisers, Advertising & 
Selling summarized this view:
It is probably true that Mr. Average Tire-Buyer is more interested—especially in this year of 
hard times—in price comparisons than he is in the word-sparring of the contestants. 
Consequently, this advertising may be selling him more tires simply because it is telling him 
more forcibly than ever before at how low a price tires can be bought.105
Responding to criticisms in the pages of Printers’ Ink that its advertising implied 
that the advertising of other cigarette brands was false and misleading, The Ameri-
can Tobacco Co. took the position that such advertising performed an informative 
consumer service. In a letter to Eldridge Peterson, editor of Printers’ Ink, American 
Tobacco president Paul M. Hahn argued the following:
In our opinion, an advertiser in a competitive business who makes statements of questionable 
validity in his advertising does, and should expect, to expose those statements to criticism by 
his competitors in the market place in which they are competing for public favor. We think 
that such criticism is healthy and in the interest of good advertising.106
Numerous sources during this period, however, expressed the concern that com-
parative advertising would cause not informed consumers but confused ones. This 
belief was summarized well by Charles Luckman, vice president and general manager 
of the Pepsodent Company:
We never attack the claims made for other brands because we don’t believe a competitive 
fight benefits anyone. Only the executives of the companies involved understand what the 
fight is all about. The consumers not only don’t understand but aren’t interested.107
Trade journal Advertising & Selling linked the problem with confusion, in a front-
page editorial, to the almost inevitable fact that comparative ads must present what 
appear to be conflicting claims: “Publication copy censors are throwing up their hands 
at the enormity of today’s task of reconciling competing claims.”108
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Believability. The majority of advertisers and industry observers argued that compara-
tive advertising was not believable, but this belief was consistently linked with a 
comparative advertising trend that occurred during this period, which also sparked a 
great deal of criticism—that of attacking competitors’ advertising rather than the 
poor quality or other limitations of their products. The emergence of this trend was 
explained especially well by a Printers’ Ink author, who linked the aggressive com-
parative advertising of the early Depression once again with bombast and ballyhoo 
and, equally important, challenged its ethicality. He lamented the trend in the fol-
lowing way:
Advertising began to overtake merit as a competitive factor. Copy became louder and, 
regrettably, funnier. The bass drums and tin horns of the Barnum era were heard in most 
unlikely quarters. Logically, the next step would have been open attack upon competitive 
products. But this was, by common consent, unethical. What to do? All those acres of 
bellowing type were neutralizing each other. Something had to be done about it. . . . So that’s 
your solution, is it? Don’t knock the other fellow’s goods—knock his advertising!109
Advertising & Selling criticized the trend with almost identical comments and like-
wise compared it with the professionally embarrassing advertising of the mid- to late-
1800s. “Once before advertising got a bit too intimate with Buncombe. Recall the 
Patent Medicine Era? . . . Running Buncombe a close second as a confidence-sapper 
is the current wave of advertising that knocks competitors.”110 As William B. Wisdom, 
advertising manager for the Union Indemnity Company, critically observed, “It is eco-
nomically unsound to knock your competitor’s advertising. . . . . What does it profit a 
man who convinces the whole world that his competitor’s advertising is poor, if the 
public has forgotten that he has a product for sale?”111
A single source, advertising agency president S. O. Landry, expressed a favorable 
belief in the tactic of attacking a competitor’s advertising. As he argued,
I believe in an advertiser expressing his personality and if he can do so by fighting the claims 
of his competitors skillfully and well, then more power to him. . . . I do not see any reason to 
get alarmed because one manufacturer knocks the advertising of another.112
Sources during this period offered three significant insights into advertisers’ beliefs 
regarding comparative advertising’s believability. First, some linked the issue of 
believability with the presence of directly conflicting claims about competing prod-
ucts. As Advertising & Selling editorialized,
If war will sell more goods than peace, why don’t we all pitch at our nearest competitor? At 
first thought, it would seem that such ill nature displayed to public view might regale the 
consumer but would leave him in such a bewildered state of mind as not to know whom to 
believe—if anybody.113
In reference to an ongoing comparative advertising war among Ford, Chevrolet, 
and Plymouth automobile dealers, Printers’ Ink concluded the following: “After read-
ing the contradictory facts and figures, many a prospective automobile buyer must 
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have decided to follow Ed Wynn’s advice and buy a horse.”114 Another Printers’ Ink 
author stated the problem even more directly: “But when one party says one thing and 
the other states what seems to be a directly conflicting fact, the likely conclusion of the 
consumer is that one of the two is a liar—probably both.”115
Writing metaphorically about an advertising “feud” between two paint companies, 
NBC network radio sales promotion manager Joseph A. Ecclestine summarized this 
view and strongly suggested that it continued throughout the period:
Asserting that you are the leader in your field is probably good for your ego—if your ego is 
the kind that requires such assertion. But I find it hard to overlook the fact that I’m not 
interested in your ego—only in mine. And that the next man is even less interested than I am. 
I also find myself suspecting that neither Hatfield nor McCoy is a leader in anything, but 
money or noise.116
A second theme having to do with the problem of believability was expressed by a 
broad majority of advertisers and industry observers, and this was the belief that com-
parative advertising threatened the believability of advertising for all the competitors 
in an industry or product category. A Printers’ Ink author early in the period spoke 
for many with the following observation: “For you can’t discredit the other fellow’s 
advertising without discrediting your own. Old John J. Public’s reaction is simple, 
obvious and reasonable. ‘So I mustn’t believe A’s advertising, eh? Well, why should 
I believe B’s, C’s, or Z’s?’”117 Advertising agency president Marsh K. Powers stated 
the problem even more directly:
The advertiser who is tempted to employ copy which slurs advertising should first ask 
himself this question—“If I warn readers that advertisers are prevaricators, why should they 
believe my statements, when, by the very act of using advertising, I class myself with the 
falsifiers and public enemies whom I criticize?”118
Media managers and publishers, often caught in the untenable position of arbitrat-
ing comparative advertising wars and facing the threat of lost business from angry 
advertisers, shared the concern about the long-term damage to entire product catego-
ries and industries. One publisher anonymously bemoaned the problem in the pages 
of Printers’ Ink:
But far more important than either the publisher or the advertiser individually, is the 
adverse influence these copy discussions have on all advertising; the effect they have on 
undermining women’s (and men’s) confidence in the whole industry of which the 
participants are but a part.119
A third point of view, also shared by a significant majority, was that comparative 
advertising threatened the veracity of not just advertising in specific industries and product 
categories, but all advertising. Again, however, the belief was almost always associated 
directly with the period’s tendency for advertisers to attack the truthfulness of competi-
tors’ advertising. As advertising man William Wisdom opined, comparing the damage 
caused by comparative advertising to that of the period’s paid-testimonial scandal,
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Viewed from a purely ethical standpoint, such statements, claims and exposures as we read 
today shake the faithful public’s faith in all advertising. The extravagant use of testimonials 
has dealt advertising one body blow. There is no use in aggravating the situation by an 
internecine struggle between advertisers.120
Edward L. Greene, general manager of the National Better Business Bureau 
(NBBB), also concisely summarized the beliefs of many with the following warning: 
“Can business complain of a lack of consumer confidence if it endorses and uses 
advertising which is a public record of competitive criticism—deliberately designed to 
shake public confidence in competitive business?”121 R. H. Macy & Company execu-
tive Paul Hollister offered a similar criticism: “I believe that the public’s confidence in 
all advertising is diluted, weakened, by the outrageous competitive wars that are being 
printed in national newspaper advertising.”122 This view is also apparent in statements 
from the Dallas Advertising League (DAL) nearly twenty years later. Concerned by 
what its members called an “attack by implication on the integrity of all advertising” 
in comparative advertising for Lucky Strikes, the group adopted a resolution calling 
on The American Tobacco Co. to discontinue the campaign.123
Many publishers and media managers shared the prevalent belief that compara-
tive advertising was responsible for damage to the believability of advertising as an 
institution. Comments by Frank Braucher, vice president of The Crowell Publishing 
Company (publisher of widely read Collier’s Weekly), help explain the concerns of the 
period’s media executives. As he wrote,
Right now we are in the era of what is called “1931 Advertising.” If 1931 advertising means 
what it appears to mean, it is highly competitive, high explosive advertising. The kind of 
advertising which it seems to me if carried to its logical conclusion will destroy the 
effectiveness of advertising media. It will destroy something that the advertiser needs, the 
agent must have and the publisher cannot under his present set-up exist without, namely the 
believability of advertising.124
A comparative advertising war among replacement auto tire manufacturers and 
merchandisers confirms that many newspaper and magazine executives were strug-
gling to sustain the believability of advertising and the credibility of their publications 
using what advertisers of the day derisively referred to as “censorship.” At the time, 
both Montgomery Ward & Co. and Sears, Roebuck & Co. often compared their pri-
vate label tires with those of branded competitors, by name, taking advantage of the 
fact that they had complete control over the content of their own catalogs.
As president of the only major tire company that did not manufacture tires for the 
catalogers, Harvey Firestone counterattacked with newspaper ads calling for a “show-
down” on the “misleading” claims of the “mail order houses” (see Figure 8). Despite 
not directly naming his mail-order foes, however, some newspapers refused Firestone’s 
ads. As Business Week reported at the time, “Mr. Firestone has had considerable dif-
ficulty in having his comparative advertising published. Some publishers accepted it 
‘because others did,’ some carried it under protest. The Chicago Tribune and the New 
York Daily News refused it.”125
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Figure 8. “Let’s have a showdown.”
Source: Advertising & Selling, June 10, 1931, 21. Firestone is a registered trademark of Bridgestone 
Brands, LLC.
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Affective outcomes. A majority during this period expressed the belief that comparative 
advertising encouraged negative attitudes toward the ads themselves. Ralph Starr But-
ler, vice president of the General Foods Corporation and author of the first marketing 
textbook, captured this belief when he wrote the following:
Leaving out entirely the question of business ethics, this sort of competitive advertising will 
not pay . . . Prolongation of it and more accessions to the ranks of its users may easily result 
in public disgust with advertising as a business tool.126
Butler also warned that continued use of the tactic could encourage the period’s 
many calls to bring advertising under further regulatory control by the federal govern-
ment. Claude Hopkins also warned that comparative ads would encourage dislike:
Nobody has grown more weary of the waste, the ineffectiveness, the palaver in cigarette 
advertising. But I believe that people are sick of wars, political and commercial. And I 
cannot imagine the throwing up of hats at an avalanche of brick-bats.127
The statements of some advertisers and industry observers offer helpful insights 
into what it was about comparative advertising that they believed contributed to nega-
tive consumer attitudes toward it. Numerous sources throughout the latter half of this 
period pointed to two related causes for negative attitudes—the perception that com-
parative advertising is excessively competitive and, consequently, in poor taste. As 
one Printers’ Ink author noted, “Internal wars in advertising come and go but all the 
time a greater Taboo has arisen—the public’s Taboo on bad taste in advertising.”128 
This view was summarized perfectly by Printers’ Ink columnist Aesop Glim: “Next, 
you must recognize that some of your prospects have a certain peculiar sense of taste 
that makes them reject all competitive selling.”129
Advertising attorney Morton J. Simon similarly captured this view in an Advertis-
ing Agency piece about the legal implications of what he referred to as “acrimonious 
advertising warfare” and disparagement: “Someone has said: ‘I hate the man who 
builds his name, On the ruins of another’s fame.’”130 J. Walter Thompson executive 
Joseph Stone also linked dislike of comparative advertising to its excessive competi-
tiveness and called for advertisers to avoid it. As he argued,
The coming months may see all the old high-pressure methods dusted off. They may see 
slants that not only hurt advertisers but undermine the standing of their whole industry. But 
those companies who move forward and those industries which raise their standards of 
advertising while others are raising a rumpus will find themselves ahead. But whatever we 
do, let’s drop that tired bromide—“competitive.”131
Another interesting and important facet of the negative attitudes theme to emerge 
from the data has to do with the attitudes of channel members toward comparative 
manufacturer advertising. Comparative advertisers who also relied on distributors 
and retailers discovered the same problem George Washington Hill had in 1928. In 
some cases, channel members sold both the comparative advertiser’s product and 
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jmo.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Beard 141
the competitor’s. One advertiser described this problem with channel members, telling 
Printers’ Ink what he decided to do about it. As he reported,
Some of them actually asked us to stop our national advertising. They said it was hurting 
their business as a whole more than it was enlarging it in our lines. Accordingly, in the 
second year of our campaign, we threw out all comparison and began to confine ourselves to 
direct statement of what our material would do. Complaints from distributors, retailers and 
outside sources naturally came to an end.132
A majority during this period also expressed the view that comparative advertising 
causes negative attitudes toward the advertiser’s brand. And as during the previous 
period, some identified the cause of these negative attitudes as backlash. As Printers’ 
Ink warned, “Rather often, ‘fighting copy’ back-fires. . . . Too often it besmirches the 
name and the long-pull reputation of him who uses it.”133 And as Aesop Glim similarly 
declared, “Competitive copy admits that you have some competition and that you are 
afraid of that competition; otherwise, you wouldn’t be mentioning it.”134
The belief that comparative advertising would specifically cause a backlash of 
negative attitudes toward comparative advertisers and their products or brands among 
the users of the comparison product was also mentioned for the first time during this 
period. Printers’ Ink Monthly summarized this view:
Frequently it is difficult for a seller of quality merchandise to say all he knows he should say 
about his product without being tempted to make disparaging remarks about competition. 
But he realizes that his own case may be weakened if he yields to the temptation. He may 
succeed only in starting an unprofitable argument. And if his prospective customer has 
already bought, or even decided to buy an alternative product, he will be inclined to resent 
any sales talk that may prove to him that his judgment was wrong. Such is human nature.135
Aesop Glim stated this point of view even more directly: “If we imply that our 
prospect is a fool to be using some competitor’s wares when he could be enjoying the 
unique benefits of our wares, we have undoubtedly overplayed our hand.”136
Conative outcomes. Only a few sources during this period mentioned the effectiveness 
of comparative advertising for directly achieving sales or other behavioral outcomes. 
As mentioned earlier, many tobacco industry observers confirmed the sales effective-
ness of the Reach for a Lucky campaign. As Printers’ Ink reported, “That competing 
interests have sometimes opposed the publicity methods of American Tobacco merely 
reflects the effectiveness of the campaigns.”137 Referring to Westinghouse’s sand test 
campaign, Jack D. Lee, manager of Westinghouse’s laundry-equipment division, sim-
ilarly praised the sales effectiveness of his advertising: “There’s no doubt the sand test 
has produced more direct sales for us than anything we’ve ever tried.”138
On the other hand, Kenyon & Eckhardt executive William Green refuted the sales 
effectiveness of comparative advertising with his colorful description of a discussion 
of the topic between a sales manager and advertising manager:
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And every other week a certain sales manager was tearing out his hair at the latest competitive 
ad. “Ye gods,” he’d yell on these occasions to his advertising men. “We gotta get an ad out 
quick to refute this. These guys are going to ruin us with their claims.” . . . But one day he’d 
(the advertising man) had enough. “Do you think,” he asked, “that this competitive stuff is 
serious?” The sales manager did. “How are sales?” the adman asked. “Holding up pretty 
well.” “I’ll tell you something,” the adman ventured, with an unusual show of bravado. “If 
your prospects paid 10% as much attention to those competitive claims as you do, you’d 
really be in a bad way. Right?” There was a labored silence. “Let’s see that new layout you 
just brought over,” said the sales manager. “And I hope it calls attention to our equipment 
rather than our competitor’s.”139
Situational Factors
Nature of the claim. During this period, many critics of comparative advertising linked 
its undesirability to the likelihood that such advertising would fail to mention a salient 
claim on behalf of the advertiser. Most associated it with the period’s tendency for 
advertisers to attack each other’s advertising. Adman William Wisdom summarized 
this view in the following way:
In drawing attention to his competitor’s advertising he is keeping the competitive product 
before their eyes and omitting to tell them how good his product is and what makes it good. 
. . . If you and I go out to shoot rabbits and start shooting at each other, we are not going to 
get many rabbits.140
Aesop Glim also argued the importance of a salient benefit:
Quite obviously, the only effective comparisons will be those which are somehow 
constructive and helpful to our prospect. The comparisons must tell him something he didn’t 
know—give him information by which he can benefit—and do it in a manner which earns 
belief.141
As Claude Hopkins wrote in his criticism of a counterattack on George Washington 
Hill by R. J. Reynolds on behalf of the Camel brand,
Certainly there is some genius who can bring cigarettes into a flattering limelight. Just as 
others have done on countless lines which have a hearthold in the home. Not by sheer 
force, not by attack. Not by any evidence of internal disagreements. But by a theme which 
leads on the tide of popular favor which cigarettes since the war have happily 
engendered.142
Other contributors confirmed that comparative advertising was appropriate and 
likely to be effective when the product possessed a true feature of superiority, often 
based on superior quality, and linked to its believability via substantiation. The 
American Tobacco Co. argued this point in the pages of Printers’ Ink, while defending 
what was viewed by many to be an overly aggressive comparative campaign: “It’s 
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certainly human nature—and no breach of ethics—for one to say he is better than the 
other fellow, and why; especially when he feels he has conclusive proof and states 
it.”143 Westinghouse executive Jack D. Lee similarly praised the sand test campaign, 
linking it to the selling of product features and benefits: “There has been a lot of talk 
in the industry recently about the need to return to selling the product and to abandon 
price selling. We think the sand test is a prime example of selling the product. To those 
who criticize us and charge us with unfair tactics, we say, “You can’t sell Heaven if 
you don’t knock Hell.”144
Others pointed to subtle shading of the truth as a contributing factor to what they 
perceived to be a frequent problem with the claims in comparative ads. As Printers’ 
Ink editorialized,
Ironically enough, some of the most viciously offensive competitive copy is wholly true, 
judged by the strict letter of the law. But it often takes advantage of a technicality—accurately 
stated, too—in a way that puts the rival product under an undeserved and unfair handicap. 
This violation of advertising ethics is as bad as plain and unadulterated lying.145
Ads are more creative. Despite the prevalent and aggressive use of comparative adver-
tising during the Depression and its frequent discussion, sources proposed only two 
tactical recommendations for the effective execution of comparative advertising. First, 
in Printers’ Ink’s description of a comparative advertising war between Chicago’s 
Peoples Gas Light & Coke Company and the Chicago Coal Merchants Association, 
the journal described the use of
an entirely new weapon of advertising combat—the reverse testimonial. The term is 
arbitrary—perhaps “non-testimonial” would be a good name. It designates a testimonial 
quotation of a consumer letter which proclaims, not eulogy of the advertiser’s own products, 
but contempt of the competing one.146
Aesop Glim offered the period’s only other tactical recommendation for executing 
a comparative ad. As he instructed,
In essence, you’re going to say. “Ordinary widgets have these weaknesses.” Say that, get 
completely through with all the details of that subject, before you go on to say, “By contrast, 
Schmaltz’ Widgets are thus and thus.” Don’t say, “Schmaltz’ Widgets are thus and so—
whereas ordinary widgets have these weaknesses.” You want your prospect to come to the 
end of your story with a strong, positive conviction regarding your wares. . . . Work from the 
negative to the positive—never from the positive to the negative.147
An important theme to emerge from the data during this period in terms of a com-
parative ad’s creativity is best defined as “opportunism.” Moreover, often the advertis-
ing of competitors was the source of these opportunities. As the dispute over the 
comparative strength of all-steel versus wood-and-steel auto bodies heated up, for 
example, Chevrolet ran the ad shown in Figure 9, declaring that “if your elephant 
wants to ride on top, it’s all right with a Chevrolet.” A group of Houston, Texas, Ford 
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Figure 9. “If your elephant wants to ride on top.”
Source: Advertising & Selling, September 14, 1933, 48. Chevrolet is a registered trademark of General 
Motors LLC.
dealers exploited the opportunity with the tongue-in-cheek response shown in Figure 10, 
offering a $500 reward to anyone who would take an elephant for a ride on his or her 
Chevrolet.148
However, another almost concurrent episode demonstrated that opportunism is a 
knife that can cut both ways. Both Chevrolet and the Chrysler Corporation were quick 
to take comparative advertising advantage of Henry Ford’s refusal to sign on to 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s National Industrial Recovery Act (NRA) automo-
bile code. The code mandated, among other things, specific levels of production, 
wages, hours of work, and prices. In reference to the NRA’s distinctive Blue Eagle 
symbol, Ford is reported to have said, “Hell, that Roosevelt buzzard. I wouldn’t put it 
on the car.”149 Two years later, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the entire NRA was 
unconstitutional.
Degree of negativity. The majority of sources during this period criticized excessively 
negative comparative advertising. Claude Hopkins summarized this belief with his criti-
cism of R. J. Reynolds’s attack on George Washington Hill. In a full-page, all-copy ad 
in national newspapers, R. J. Reynolds criticized Hill (referred to throughout the copy 
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Figure 10. “Take a 6-ton Elephant for a ride.”
Source: Advertising & Selling, September 14, 1933, 48. Ford is a registered trademark of Ford Motor 
Company.
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as “he”) for making false statements in his advertising, and further publicized the fact 
that he had recently been ordered by the FTC to cease using false testimonials from 
nonsmokers, claiming that they kept slender by smoking Luckies. As Hopkins wrote,
Some methods strike a responsive chord which lead to overwhelming favor. Some arouse 
dislike. I hope that George Hill will not take up the gauntlet Camel has laid. I think that a 
shiver went over all of us when we read that page attack.150
At about the same time, some note of what many practitioners believed caused 
comparative ads to be viewed as excessively negative and problematic began to appear 
among the sources. American Association of Advertising Agencies (AAAA) president 
Joel Benton declared, in a speech to the feuding members of the National Tire Dealers’ 
Association, that comparative ads should not include false statements about competi-
tors’ products, that they should not promote the advertiser’s product by attributing 
faults to an entire industry that were true of only a few members, and that they should 
not attack a competitor’s advertising. More important, however, was Benton’s first 
admonition: “In the first place,” he said, “no competing product should be named or 
referred to by name in any derogatory way.”151 Federal Advertising Agency president 
Robert Tinsman similarly implored his contemporaries: “Advertising is on trial, like it 
or not. . . . It must stop being offensively mean, and come clean, regardless of competi-
tive attitudes. Let us resume the dignity that advertising almost won for itself after 
years of struggle.”152
The sole exception to appear in the literature of this period linked his favorable 
view of aggressively comparative advertising to the belief that it was competitively 
persuasive. Once again, it was adman S. O. Landry, who argued the following:
Business is a fight and advertising is a part of the fight. . . . If the advertising agency, or the 
advertising man, tones down all his messages to the public; if he cuts out all the strong talk, 
deletes all the ideas and takes every thought out of it except the few platitudes and generalities 
that anybody can use, then I think his advertising is becoming weak.153
Perhaps as a consequence of the desperate and “viciously offensive” comparative 
advertising of the 1930s, some sources began to point out the importance of limiting 
the negativity or, better yet, avoiding it all together. Arguing that excessively nega-
tive comparative advertising wars often made advertisers look foolish, Printers’ Ink 
proposed,
If advertisers must fight in print, and if they must incur the risk of being unconsciously 
comical, why in the name of common sense don’t they obviate that risk by anticipating and 
disarming the chuckles with at least a glint of humor in the copy, itself?154
Much later in the period, advertising executive and marketing textbook author 
Edward E. B. Weiss similarly referred to the importance of maintaining a positive 
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tone, and avoiding the appearance of excessive negativity, with good sportsmanship. 
As he wrote,
Now it strikes me that the American public has given abundant evidence of our love of good 
sportsmanship. It was this national characteristic that helped make Plymouth’s Look at All 
Three such an instantaneous success. Competitive rivalry, until then, had publicly displayed 
little sportsmanship.155
Trade journal Domestic Engineering elaborated on this preference in favor of 
positivity:
Whether it be the politician, smiling pleasantly and chucking babies under the chin, the 
salesman making his approach at the front door, or a merchandising message in print, the art 
of persuasion demands almost without exception that the thing which is offered be offered in 
pleasant associations. This is another way of saying that constructive selling is more effective 
than destructive selling.156
Lord & Thomas executive Robert L. Philippi similarly proposed,
When you run into a product which seems to have no exclusive, logical story (and the 
inclination is to resort to hog-calling) why not take a tip from radio? Use the advertising 
pages to entertain, instruct, or otherwise divert the reader—with a couple of sales messages 
and a reasonable amount of product identity thrown in?157
Significant insight into this theme is evident in Printer’s Ink Monthly’s praise of the 
humorous approach shown in Figure 11’s comparative ad for a home heating com-
pany: “The sting was removed by means of jocular treatment in the text and cartoon 
illustrations that could hardly help leaving the reader in good humor.”158
The 1960s to 1970s
Similar to earlier decades, Richard Pollay found that the use of implied comparisons 
of competitive standing remained about the same in magazine advertising during the 
1960s and 1970s. However, while the frequency of use of explicit comparative ads 
remained small, it nearly doubled during these two decades to 3% and 4%, respec-
tively.159 Other sources, moreover, establish beyond question that the use of explicit 
comparative advertising soared during this period, as did Printers’ Ink in a 
“Commentary” piece, published in 1966. As the journal reported, “Some admen call it 
‘disparagement,’ others object that this word is neither adequate nor accurate. Whatever 
it is it’s spreading like soot and it seems to have caught the conscience of the advertis-
ing industry with its definitions down.”160
The early-1960s also saw a comparative advertising campaign and ensuing war 
that many believe established the modern era of comparative advertising—Avis Inc. 
versus Hertz Corporation.161 The groundbreaking Avis “We Try Harder” campaign—
which continued as a central theme of Avis advertising until 2012—placed 10th on 
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Figure 11. “Spencer Heating Clinic.”
Source: Printers’ Ink Monthly, November, 1941, 22.
Ad Age’s list of the top 100 campaigns of the twentieth century.162 Although Hertz 
declined to counterattack for several years, and the company’s initial rejection of this 
strategy led to an advertising agency change, they ultimately did with the following 
copy: “For years, Avis has been telling you Hertz is No. 1. Now we’re going to tell 
you ‘why.’”
Throughout the mid-1960s and early-1970s, national advertisers were increasingly 
naming names. Indeed, Advertising Age columnist Sidney A. Diamond declared 
toward the end of this period that “Brand X now is just a historical curiosity.”163 Much 
of the discussion in the trade literature about comparative advertising throughout the 
1970s focused on the television networks and their affiliates. The reason is that the 
networks’ policies had previously prohibited comparative ads, with the exception of 
NBC, which changed its clearance policy in 1965 and began accepting “substantiated 
comparative ads.” In fact, the effectiveness of the networks’ clearance policies, com-
bined with the National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) Television Code, likely 
explains why many have thought comparative advertising was “illegal” in the United 
States. The entire network spectrum opened up, however, in late-1971 and early-1972 
when the FTC persuaded networks ABC and CBS to give comparative advertising a 
one-year trial.
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The FTC’s campaign to encourage comparative advertising—inspired by the peri-
od’s political, economic, and regulatory philosophy of deregulation,164 and based on 
the belief that it would lead to more informative and less misleading advertising—led 
to a flood of comparative ads in the broadcast media. It also brought the federal agency 
into direct confrontation with the advertising industry. Although advertisers clearly 
wanted to identify competitors, they also hoped to maintain greater requirements for 
substantiation for what they often viewed to be questionably valid comparisons and, 
especially, limits on disparagement.
The FTC’s investigation and subsequent campaign of litigation in support of com-
parative advertising was extensive. The agency proposed new rules to keep profes-
sional groups and state agencies from restricting competitive advertising for drugs, 
funeral services, and eyeglasses. It also called for the elimination of strictures on dis-
paragement established by associations in industries as varied as liquor, beer, toys, air 
conditioners, soaps, seat belts, and savings and loans. More important, the FTC’s cam-
paign targeted both the Council of Better Business Bureaus’ (CBBB) rule that adver-
tisers could not refer to a competitor by name when reporting comparative test data 
and the NAB’s ban on comparative superiority claims in toy advertising.165
Despite the advertising industry’s and the networks’ hopes and efforts to retain 
control over comparative advertising by way of their own self-regulatory bodies (e.g., 
the National Advertising Division of the CBBB), industry association codes, and 
media clearance policies, they were ultimately forced to acquiesce to the power of the 
FTC. This turbulent period for those involved in the regulatory battle over compara-
tive advertising ended on August 13, 1979, when the FTC published a restatement of 
its comparative advertising policy. The agency’s intent was to make it clear once and 
for all that industry codes prohibiting disparagement would be “subject to challenge” 
and that codes requiring a higher standard of substantiation for comparative ads and 
claims were “inappropriate and should be revised.”166
Direct Effects
Cognitive outcomes. During this period, advertisers overwhelmingly agreed that com-
parative advertising attracts attention and creates awareness. The marketer of a new 
brand of antacid that identified competitors Alka-Seltzer and Bromo Seltzer in its ads 
made it clear the attention value was due to the still-unusual nature of identifying a 
competitor. As Brioschi company president Marco Brizzolara told Sales Management, 
“Actually saying ‘Alka-Seltzer’ in the new ad has shock value—capturing the atten-
tion of the consumer. And that is the whole secret of advertising.”167 This belief is also 
evident in a piece about the Cola Wars. As an Advertising Age author reported, “Pri-
vately, Pepsi officials say they never liked knocking Coke, but when they learned it 
gave them some recognition they had failed to attract by other techniques, they felt 
obligated to use comparative advertising.”168
Advertisers during this period, in the main, also expressed the belief that com-
parative advertising could be informative. William D. Tyler—who held major creative 
posts at agencies Young & Rubicam, Dancer Fitzgerald Sample, Leo Burnett agency, 
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and Benton & Bowles—summarized this view: “It is not only a powerful selling tool, 
it can provide consumers with valuable buying information, something our critics say 
there is precious little of in advertising today.”169 One of comparative advertising’s 
most devoted advocates during this period, Stanley Tannenbaum, chairman of agency 
Kenyon & Eckhardt, Inc., also seemed to speak for many when he wrote,
It makes the consumer more conscious of his responsibility to himself to compare before he 
buys. . . . I say that comparative advertising—naming names in a case like this—is performing 
a consumer service and doing what advertising should do: provide useful information and 
promote better product development.170
However, the belief that comparative advertising creates awareness for the com-
parison product or service was also prevalent during this period. As several import and 
domestic automakers made the increasingly popular Volkswagen Beetle the target of 
their comparative ads, an unidentified executive at agency Doyle Dane Bernbach 
clearly captured this point of view in his comments to Advertising Age: “Every time 
somebody uses Volkswagen to make a comparison, it’s space we don’t have to pay 
for.”171 Wayne K. Nelson, head of McNeil Laboratories’ consumer products unit, and 
in reference to the controversial comparative price introduction of Bristol-Myers’s 
Datril pain reliever, told Advertising Age that “the ads have had the effect of acquaint-
ing consumers with Tylenol as well as Datril.”172 However, it is also important to note 
that the Datril versus Tylenol episode was unique because Tylenol, despite holding 
10% of the analgesic market at the time, had never been advertised directly to consum-
ers. As one source proposed, with regard to the campaign, “Not only was a price com-
parison on national television highly unusual, but the naming of a competitor that had 
never been advertised to the general public was even more startling.”173
Similarly, Ogilvy & Mather (O&M) chairman Andrew Kershaw, unquestionably 
the industry’s single most vocal critic of comparative advertising during this period, 
summarized this view, which he based on a widely cited proprietary O&M study:
Comparative television advertising does not offer any advantage to the package goods 
advertiser. It does not increase brand identification. It makes consumers more aware of 
competitors. It results in lower belief in claims. It results in increased miscommunication and 
confusion.174
Despite the surging use of comparative advertising during this period, or possibly 
because of it, many advertisers and media executives agreed with Kershaw that it fre-
quently caused confusion. As the television networks struggled to manage the flood of 
comparative ads in the 1970s, CBS’s director of commercial clearance, Jack Hinton, 
succinctly stated this belief: “CBS feels that comparative advertising is not always 
making for a better informed consumer, but is more often creating a confused con-
sumer.”175 The concerns of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), stated in a 
letter to the chairman of analgesic marketer Sterling Drugs, also captured this view 
and suggested an explanation for it. The comparative advertising war between Tylenol 
marketer Johnson & Johnson’s McNeil Laboratories (e.g., “Why doctors recommend 
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Tylenol more than all leading aspirin brands combined.”) and Bayer Aspirin marketer 
Sterling Drugs (e.g., “Makers of Tylenol, shame on you!”) became so vicious, the 
FDA told Sterling Drugs that commissioner Donald Kennedy believed the ads were 
“causing confusion that will ultimately result in erosion of public confidence in self-
medication products.”176
But this view was not the only one to find expression in this period. The belief that 
comparative advertising causes confusion was refuted by Tannenbaum, and based on 
the rationale that consumers are smart. As he argued,
So, for the dwindling minority who would have us believe—in their sincere but nonetheless 
mistaken conviction—that comparative advertising confuses the consumer and undermines 
his confidence in all advertising, may I quote David Ogilvy: “Never underestimate the 
intelligence of the consumer. She is your wife.”177
Believability. The three dimensions of disbelief—that comparative ads themselves are 
not believable, that they cause consumers to question the believability of all advertis-
ing in a product category, and that they call into question the veracity of advertising as 
an institution—were all evident during this period. Although there were clearly a 
growing number of comparative advertising advocates, by far the majority who 
expressed their beliefs in print argued that the ads were not believable. Father of moti-
vation research Ernest Dichter, in a speech to the members of the Chicago Chapter of 
the American Marketing Association, argued that comparative advertising was not 
believable for the same reason many of his contemporaries did during the prior 
period—the problem with conflicting claims. Dichter, however, also linked the prob-
lem with believability to increasingly exaggerated competitive claims in ongoing 
advertising wars. As Dichter explained,
You cannot advertise for 40 or 50 years, and conduct comparisons, without arousing 
suspicion in the consumer and bringing about a reaction comparable to a plague on both your 
houses. The more confusing and vicious the mutual attacks become, the more the respondent 
comes to the conclusion that he had better rely on his own judgment and not on what he is 
being told in the ad.178
Even the period’s most vocal comparative advertising advocate, Kenyon & 
Eckhardt’s Tannenbaum, was forced to admit there might occasionally be a problem 
with believability. As he wrote, “Even when true and valid, if the comparison is drasti-
cally inconsistent with consumer beliefs, we risk the loss of credibility.”179
However, a small minority agreed with Tannenbaum that comparative advertising 
encourages believability. After describing the industry “laws, codes and customs” 
that had previously and successfully discouraged explicit comparative advertising, 
Printers’ Ink observed, in a lengthy article published in 1966, that these assump-
tions “failed to anticipate a new middle-ground ethic which holds that name-naming 
within limits is not only proper, but realistic and refreshing.”180 Moreover, the jour-
nal cited Murray Valenstein, copresident of agency Leber Katz Paccione, regarding 
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a comparative campaign he was responsible for on behalf of Hudson’s Bay scotch. 
As he explained,
What we’ve done . . . is to recreate the same situation which faces the customer when he 
walks into a package store—the various competing brands lined up on the shelf. . . . People 
have become sophisticated beyond “Brand X.”181
The point of view that comparative advertising causes disbelief for the advertising of 
all competitors in a product or service category was prevalent during this period. As many 
advertisers did during the previous period, the majority linked this problem with disbelief 
to comparative advertising that challenged the believability of one or more competitors’ 
ads. Critical of a Sears Roebuck and Co. campaign that warned consumers not to be 
“bamboozled” by the prices in their competitors’ advertising, Printers’ Ink conjectured,
The question does arise whether this creates the impression that all manufacturers’ suggested 
prices are either artificially high or phony. . . . What’s more, by declaring itself the saint 
among the sinners, doesn’t Sears sow doubt as to the probability or possibility of its own 
regular prices being inflated?182
Influential advertising man Fairfax Cone—a protégé of advertising pioneer Albert 
Lasker and cofounder of agency Foote, Cone and Belding—also came out publicly 
against his contemporaries’ more frequent use of comparative advertising. Moreover, 
he was especially critical of the exaggerated claims that so often seemed to character-
ize it. In a speech to the Chicago Chapter of the Public Relations Society of America, 
Cone warned,
The misuse and abuse of advertising is bad for all business. For one thing, it is only a matter 
of time, if exaggerated competitive claims continue to be hurled by scores of rivals in business, 
before none will have any effect at all on any but the small unthinking part of our public.183
Many of those involved with the advertising industry’s self-regulatory groups, 
media executives, and advertisers, in the main, agreed that comparative advertising 
damaged the institutional veracity of advertising. Here again, some critics linked 
their concerns to advertising that included comparative claims of questionable valid-
ity. William H. Tankersley, then president of the CBBB, told the Economic Club of 
Chicago that not only had six years of comparative advertising on network television 
produced few consumer benefits, but also “the plethora of such ads has further dam-
aged the credibility of advertising with equal negative effect on the mores of civilized 
business behavior.”184 Furthermore, he made it clear that ongoing advertising wars and 
the potential for increasingly misleading claims were major causes of the problem. As 
he explained to Advertising Age,
Allowing advertisers injured by unfair comparisons to respond through “counter advertising,” 
as he said one ex-FTC commissioner has suggested, is an example of “jungle morality, 
paying lip service to competition, but placing an impossible burden on both consumers and 
business.”185
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Kenneth B. Wilson, president of the NBBB, also captured the view of those who 
criticized comparative campaigns that escalated into conflicting claims of question-
able validity. As he argued, “Exaggeration by one ‘knocking’ advertiser leads to fur-
ther exaggeration by his competitors and eventually to outright misrepresentation. In 
the ensuing welter of conflicting claims, reader confidence in all advertising is 
damaged.”186
The next year, the release of a 1966 AAAA policy statement condemning compara-
tive advertising that “untruthfully or unfairly depicts or disparages competitive prod-
ucts or services” received front-page attention in Advertising Age.187 The journal 
reported that the AAAA statement was a result of months of pleas for comparative 
advertising reform from the NAB’s code authority, the NBBB, the Advertising 
Federation of America, and several other industry groups. As the journal reported, 
“All of these have asked for a curb on advertising that belittles competition in order to 
protect the believability of all advertising.” The belief that comparative advertising 
caused damage to advertising’s institutional veracity, however, was, perhaps, sum-
marized most clearly by O&M executive Jack Roberts: “By quietly accepting creeping 
comparatives, and by being very, very good at making comparisons, we may not only 
be damaging the credibility of all advertising, but may very well be assisting consum-
ers in making a misinformed choice.”188
Affective outcomes. During this period, unlike the previous ones, the majority of com-
ments about negative attitudes toward comparative advertising are linked to the iden-
tification of competitors by name. One obvious explanation is that this was the 
dominant comparative advertising trend during this period and almost entirely related 
to FTC’s campaign to encourage comparative television advertising.
Advertisers, media executives, and industry observers made numerous references 
to the belief that comparative advertising causes negative attitudes toward the ads 
themselves. As Sales Management editorialized,
Granting such points, many advertising people still feel that name-naming, however tasteful, 
should be ruled out of the game completely. . . . Once accepted, the trend is almost certain to 
deteriorate into a free-for-all which will invite public contempt and possible governmental 
intervention.189
Of name-naming as an advertising tactic, Jack Gilbert, president of agency Gilbert 
& Felix, similarly argued, “It may be a proper approach . . . but it’s skating on very thin 
ice. Personally, I don’t believe we should expose ourselves to criticism in this 
manner.”190
NBBB president Kenneth B. Wilson also seemed to speak for many: “The bad 
manners shown by name-calling advertisers is received with resentment or revulsion 
by many thoughtful citizens to whom they would sell their wares.”191 Jack Hinton, 
CBS-TV’s director of commercial clearance, also argued, in reference to the simple 
identification of a competitor by name: “We don’t like it, most advertisers don’t like 
it, and our mail indicates consumers don’t like it.”192 Even advocate Tannenbaum 
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acknowledged that comparative advertising almost always “incurs a degree of nega-
tive reaction.”193
On the other hand, one advertiser specifically sought to find out how consumers felt 
about comparative advertising and subsequently left behind a revealing historical arti-
fact. When cigar maker Tueros ran a comparative ad offering free cigars and featuring 
the names of two of its competitors in the headline, they gave away thousands of 
cigars. But the company also received a handful of complaints from cigar smokers 
“who told us they didn’t think it was right or proper or cricket to mention the names of 
our competition in our ad.”194 The company then ran an ad asking readers to tell them 
whether they thought it was “cricket or not” to mention competitors in their ads. As the 
subsequent ad shown in Figure 12 shows, some 91.4% of those who responded were 
unoffended by the comparative tactic.
Indeed, sources during this period seemed about split over whether comparative ads 
necessarily encourage negative attitudes toward either the ads themselves or their 
sponsors. An agency executive with forty years experience, writing anonymously in 
Printers’ Ink because “his agency does not see eye to eye with him” on what he had to 
say, spoke for many in his observation that comparative ads were not always disliked 
and praised the Avis We Try Harder campaign as an example. As he argued, “Avis’ 
theme, ‘We try harder because we’re number two,’ injected an effective, hard-hitting 
note into car-rental advertising.”195 An unidentified industry leader also summarized 
this belief in his comments about a widely discussed American Motors campaign that 
named the automaker’s Big Three rivals: “I think if I were an American Motors dealer 
I’d like those ads. If I were a Chevrolet dealer, I’m not so sure. There’s no evidence 
the public dislikes them.”196
The belief that comparative ads predominantly cause negative attitudes was not 
unanimous at the television networks, either. In 1976, a representative of ABC’s 
Department of Broadcasting Standards & Practices told Tannenbaum that “During the 
past year, we have not received an unusual amount of complaints from either advertis-
ers or viewers. In fact, the amount decreased below previous years. The number of 
viewer complaints (1973 through 1976) has been negligible.”197 A representative for 
NBC’s Office of Advertising Standards similarly told Tannenbaum, “Sensitivity to 
comparison commercials lies with the ‘attacked’ rather than with the consumer. 
There’s no more question of good taste with comparison commercials than for those 
of any other type.”198
However, the view that comparative advertising would likely encourage negative 
attitudes toward all the competitors in a product category was also mentioned by sev-
eral sources during this period. In almost every instance, however, sources linked this 
belief to comparative ads that also stretched the truth, made unfair comparisons, or 
disparaged competitors. Morris A. Kaplan, president of mattress manufacturer Sealy 
Inc., summarized the views of many of these sources in a speech to the New York 
Ad Club. Critical of “stacked-deck advertising” in which “a lower-price product is 
compared on irrelevant grounds with a nationally advertised product,” he concluded 
with the statement that “Advertising that denigrates competition . . . damages all brand 
names.”199 Andrew Kershaw similarly captured the views of those concerned about 
increasingly questionable and potentially unfair claims:
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Figure 12. “Tueros . . . thanks 91.4% of you.”
Source: Advertising Age, March 30, 1970, 28.
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We have already seen that ferocious hostility erupts between corporations that used to be 
sensible, honorable competitors—all because of some stupidly provocative advertising. . . . 
Widely practiced comparative advertising could speed up the destruction of what remains of 
the free enterprise system, for in the end nobody would have any respect for business or 
advertising.200
The belief that comparative advertising would likely lead to negative attitudes 
among the users of the comparison brand was also mentioned by some sources during 
this period. One was Lawrence Light, vice president and director of research for 
agency Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn (BBDO). Writing in the first issue of a 
BBDO “Research Newsletter,” Light warned that “The American housewife . . . can 
be alienated by what she feels to be an unfair attack on one of her favorite products.”201 
Even Tannenbaum acknowledged that comparative ads often encouraged a backlash 
from users of the comparison brand. Despite the many advantages he attributed to the 
tactic, he told Advertising Age that “the comparative commercial does, however, incur 
a degree of negative reaction since it challenges the brand user’s judgment.”202
Conative outcomes. The belief that comparative advertising could successfully create 
sales occurred simultaneously during this period with the widely held belief that it 
might often cause negative attitudes toward the advertiser, possibly the brand, and the 
product or service category overall. As Printers’ Ink reported in 1966, “The old 
axiom—confidently revived during the past year—that knocking the other fellow 
doesn’t pay has been replaced by an uneasy suspicion that it is paying, and hand-
somely.”203 Moreover, while Tannenbaum claimed to have “seen comparative adver-
tising literally turn around market share overnight,”204 other sources likewise pointed 
to market share gains resulting from successful comparative campaigns on behalf of 
Schick’s Flexamatic shaver,205 Datril pain reliever,206 and Sno-Bowl bathroom 
cleaner.207
Only a few sources during this period mentioned the belief that comparative adver-
tising might also boost the sales of the competitor. Referring to the Avis We Try 
Harder campaign, Sales Management editorially proposed the following:
Hertz absorbed the Avis blitz for quite some time and then came out with a campaign of its 
own, stating the whole thing was little more than a mosquito bite, and, in fact, saying that the 
Avis barbs actually helped Hertz business. Perhaps the whole controversy will end with that 
ironic discovery.208
On the other hand, even the ultimate sales effectiveness of another of the most 
widely discussed comparative campaigns of the twentieth century, the “Pepsi Chal-
lenge” of the 1970s, was called into question. Launched in 1975, Pepsi challenged 
Coca-Cola on the basis of personal taste preference and specifically tasked the cam-
paign with improving Pepsi’s share in markets where it was unquestionably an under-
dog. Writing about the campaign in 1977, an Advertising Age author reported,
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Ironically, Coca-Cola’s sales continued to grow in markets where challenge advertising ran. 
Although Pepsi gained a few share points in its early Texas test markets, it was so far behind 
that those few points were insignificant in closing the gap between the two colas. In New 
York, the country’s biggest soft drink market, Coca-Cola even gained a few points after the 
challenge began running.209
Situational Factors
Comparative advertisers and market share. Surprisingly, the well-established contem-
porary belief and empirically supported conclusion that comparative advertising 
works most effectively for smaller advertisers was not mentioned until the 1960s. 
However, it was discussed quite extensively in the literature during and after this 
period. As an Advertising Age author reported in the mid-1970s, “Many proponents of 
the name-calling technique believe it is best applied to a small, relatively unknown 
brand going after the big brand in its category. BBDO has written that advice into its 
own published comparative advertising thinking.”210 What emerged during this period 
are two clear comparative strategies for smaller versus larger advertisers, which have 
previously been defined in the academic research literature as “Riding the Coattails” 
and “Twisting the Tiger’s Tail.”211 Advertisers and industry observers offered numer-
ous insights into the tactical advantages and disadvantages they attributed to both.
The Riding the Coattails approach involves the identification of a larger, typically 
dominant competitor for mainly associational purposes (i.e., an intent to communicate 
how the products are similar rather than different). A U.S. court of appeals decision in 
1968, which affirmed a California perfume distributor’s right to use competitor 
Chanel’s registered trademark “Chanel No. 5” in ads for his own products, legitimized 
this form of name-naming and likely encouraged the subsequent comparative product 
“knock-off” phenomenon of the late-1970s and 1980s.
This coattail-riding trend occurred despite early industry views that it was defi-
nitely unethical and should be illegal. An editorial in Printers’ Ink described the tactic 
and placed it within a context created by the period’s acrimonious debate over identi-
fying competitors by name. As the journal proposed,
Almost overlooked in the public debate is the possibility that name-naming may be used in 
some instances not to knock the competition, but to build it up and a lesser brand along with 
it. In this case, the advertiser’s motive would be to imply that Brand X was competing on 
equal terms with the market leaders hoping some of their reputation would rub off.212
Some sources simply pointed to the attention advantage resulting from associating 
the advertised product or service with a more prominent competitor. As one marketer 
proposed, referring to a comparative campaign used to introduce a new brand of ant-
acid and that mentioned competitor Alka-Seltzer, “But when you’re trying to break 
into a market that is very highly competitive, this is a dramatic way to do so.”213 Oth-
ers, however, argued that there were informational advantages resulting from riding 
on an established competitor’s coattails. An article in Brand Week cited a marketing 
executive responsible for Tums antacid, who summarized this advantage:
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A previous campaign identifying Tums as being stronger “than the leading antacid product” 
was not as effective as the one that names Rolaids. The new ads, he says, “have greatly 
increased consumer perception and made people aware that the product is not candy or 
chewing gum.”214
As a spokesperson for a major marketer with a product that had been the target of a 
comparative ad similarly told Advertising Age, “Comparative advertising gives a small 
company a chance to compete with the big guys; it doesn’t have to wait five years for 
the word to get around.”215
However, many sources during this period criticized the identification of any com-
petitors, even if it were just for the purposes of coattail riding. An anonymous editorial 
in Printers’ Ink summarized this view:
Some advertisers, well aware of this tactic, are nevertheless uncertain what should be done 
about it. It does come under the heading of “identification,” but it is closer to flattery than 
belittlement, and it is likely to be unaffected by any rules designed to curb disparagement.216
A statement by the AAAA also demonstrates how widely held this view was:
While the board of directors of the American Assn. of Advertising Agencies believes 
wholeheartedly in competition in advertising, it does not believe in advertising which 
untruthfully or unfairly depicts or disparages competitive products or services. Nor does it 
believe in advertising that uses another product’s trademark or brand name in an effort to 
trade on the reputation which the competitive brand has built through advertising and public 
acceptance. It believes that such use of competitor’s brand names, packages, and trademarks 
without express permission of such competitors should be discouraged.217
Jean J. Boddewyn—who reported the findings of an international study of com-
parative advertising in a book published in 1978 (with coinvestigator Katherin 
Marton)218—reported that this view was widely held throughout the world. As he 
wrote in 1978, “To claim that one’s product is as good as a competitive one—even 
when lauding the latter—is usually considered in non-Anglo-Saxon countries as unde-
sirable ‘parasitic’ behavior that exploits someone else’s property.”219 Indeed, com-
parative advertising remained almost entirely illegal in the European Community for 
another two decades, until Directive 97/55/EC (European Parliament and Council of 
the European Union) established that it should be permitted as long as, among other 
requirements, it was not anticompetitive, unfair, or misleading.
The Twisting the Tiger’s Tail approach involves identifying a larger competitor for 
mainly differentiative purposes, usually to claim that the smaller competitor’s product 
or service is superior. Advertisers who wrote favorably of this tactic attributed some 
of the same advantages to it as to the Riding the Coattails approach: advertisers 
achieved greater attention to their ads and also benefitted from their competitors’ 
larger advertising budgets. As advertising agency partner Marvin Cantz told 
Advertising Age, in reference to a comparative ad for automaker Renault that both 
mentioned import leader Volkswagen and claimed superiority over the Beetle, “We 
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need this approach because we don’t have Volkswagen’s budget.”220 As an executive 
with Whitehall Laboratories similarly told Advertising Age, in reference to advertising 
for antacid Bisodol that mentioned competitor Tums, “We are one of the smallest 
brands on the market, with one of the smallest ad budgets, and we needed to make the 
most impact with our money.”221
Surprisingly, the now prevalent and empirically supported belief that comparative 
advertising should be especially effective for new products and brands was not men-
tioned until 1975. Adman and Advertising Age columnist William D. Tyler offered a 
revealing report:
When I gave my talk on successful new product introductions last year, I commented on the 
surprising (to me) lack of use of the “comparative approach,” since that was already a 
growing vogue in American advertising. By comparative advertising, I mean ads that use 
direct confrontation, calling the competitor by name, using side-by-side comparisons to 
prove superior performance. . . . Well, my talk this year is full of such examples. At least a 
dozen successes depend on this technique in their advertising. You can bet that there will be 
many more in the years to come unless the newcomers abuse the privilege.222
Finally, some definite views of whether a larger competitor should respond emerged 
during this period. Sources predominantly held the view that it was a bad idea, and 
almost all of them linked their belief to the differences in size between comparative 
advertisers and their larger competitors. Agency BBDO, for instance, argued the fol-
lowing:
Research predicts that if the named competitor retaliates, the “underdog” will benefit for two 
reasons: (1) People interpret the response as a sign that the first attack may be true, and 
(2) the “association rule” holds. This rule states that when a high-status object is associated 
with a low-status object, the high-status object loses a little and the low-status object gains 
from the association.223
The president of a pet food company, and frequent target of comparative advertis-
ing, similarly told Tannenbaum, “Allen Products historically has been reluctant to 
name competitive brands in its own advertising. This is basically because we have 
40% of the premium canned dog food dollar volume and feel that a name-calling con-
test would not be in our best interest.”224
Toward the end of this period, a discussion among the members of “BrainReserve,” 
a think tank of top marketing and advertising creative professionals, revealed that 
some continued to question the effectiveness and appropriateness of comparative 
advertising and whether a larger advertiser should respond to comparative attack. 
Shirley Polykoff, creator of the landmark “Does She or Doesn’t She?” campaign for 
Clairol hair coloring, for example, tellingly referred to comparative ads as “offensive” 
and “a last resort.” As Bert Neufeld, a former creative director at agency Wells, Rich, 
Greene Inc., told Business Week, “They’re all right for the little guy trying to get ahead 
. . . but if a big guy answers back, he loses points.”225 The organization’s founder and 
CEO, Faith Popcorn, also agreed, condemning comparative ads as “the lazy way to 
advertise.” Think tank member Stuart Pittman, however, disagreed, arguing that 
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comparative ads “parallel the consumer’s experience at home where he or she . . . 
makes comparisons” and that “Americans like a street-fighter approach.”
Nature of the claim. During this period, advertisers often mentioned the importance of 
a comparative ad’s claim and their overwhelming faith in the appropriateness and 
effectiveness of one or more valid features of superiority. Sherman L. Smith, advertis-
ing manager for stapler manufacturer Stanley Bostitch, referring to his comparative 
advertising war with packing tape manufacturer 3M, summarized this view: “When 
we compare stapling with other methods of fastening, our comparisons will be ori-
ented to specific and documented instances rather than to general, broad and unsup-
ported claims.”226 Frustrated over refusals by radio stations to run his comparative ads 
for client Renault, San Francisco adman Marvin Crantz expressed the same faith in 
claims based on valid features of superiority: “If you have the slightest doubt, make us 
prove it,” Crantz told the radio stations. “The facts we state in our comparison prove 
our bold challenge.”227
Facing similar difficulties with reluctant radio stations on behalf of a group of 
regional Oldsmobile dealers, San Francisco ad agency partner Martin Rockey 
described the identical belief: “The most effective approach seemed to be a nose-to-
nose confrontation: ‘This is our car—it has this, and costs this much. This is their 
car—it has this, and costs this much. Take your choice.’”228 A Whitehall Laboratories 
executive made the point even more directly in his reference to a Bisodol comparative 
ad that named competitor Tums: “We had some very definite superiority claims to 
make and felt justified in producing a comparative commercial.”229 One of the archi-
tects of the comparative Datril launch campaign, ad agency Ted Bates & Co. creative 
supervisor Raymond Barker, told Advertising Age that “if an advertiser has an advan-
tage over a competitor, he is probably wasting ad dollars if he is not telling the con-
sumer what his benefit is in specific direct comparison to his competitors.”230
Obviously, Kenyon & Eckhardt’s Tannenbaum agreed with this view. As he 
explained, “We employ the comparison technique only in significant product attri-
butes areas where we have demonstrable superiority and where the major competitive 
brand is perceived more positively than our brand.”231 However, and based on agency 
research conducted over a period of seven years, Tannenbaum added a caveat, sug-
gesting the risk associated with the potential for a counterattack: “Whatever advan-
tages we might reap by comparison, we could lose, if the brand leader were able to 
counterargue in a more meaningful consumer-interest area where he enjoyed supe-
riority.” Advertising Age columnist, creative executive, and book author Arthur J. 
Bellaire, who wrote for years under the pseudonym “Mr. TV Byor,” described a simi-
lar belief in the value of product demonstrations. Describing a Sno-Bowl bathroom 
cleaner comparative launch campaign, he wrote,
Here is a side-by-side comparative demonstration of three leading bathroom bowl cleaners 
on a rust-stained test panel, visually proving that Sno-Bowl outperforms the leading liquid 
and dry cleaners in terms of ease and cleaning ability. With a story like this, it’s hardly 
surprising that Sno-Bowl’s sales, distribution and market share goals have been exceeded 
since the national rollout last June.232
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Referring to a comparative campaign on behalf of Coca-Cola’s Tab brand that 
demonstrated its fewer calories in a visual way, Coca-Cola executive Donald Keough, 
a veteran of the Cola Wars, called it “legitimate comparative advertising, where clear-
cut objective factors, accurately measurable are involved.” This kind of advertising 
can serve “as a source of consumer information supporting rational purchasing 
decisions.”233
Media executives and advertisers also agreed, in the main, that a comparative claim 
would be more effective if it were based on a feature or benefit that was especially 
salient to the consumer. However, almost all these views about salient points of differ-
ence were associated with what some believed to be the period’s problem with coattail 
riding and the exaggeration of minor differences in ongoing advertising wars. ABC 
executive and “censor” Alfred Schneider captured these views perfectly: “Comparisons 
do serve a purpose from the standpoint of the viewer if they abide by the key code 
guideline, and are based on something significant and meaningful to the over-all per-
formance of the product.”234 But, as he also warned, “Too often singular, unrelated, 
minor differences are being used to upgrade a product’s image in comparison to its 
named competitor, which only leads to challenges as to the appropriateness of this 
type of advertising.” After predicting that there would likely be much more compara-
tive advertising in the near future “unless the newcomers abuse the privilege,” adman 
William Tyler defined such abuse as “comparisons that mislead by implying that a 
product advantage in one feature means over-all superiority. Or stretch a point. Or lie 
a little. Or make their point in such a way as to denigrate a competitor.”235
Coca-Cola executive Donald Keough seemed to speak for many when he pointed 
to comparisons based on “highly subjective areas” as a problem with comparative 
advertising claims. Likening some of the Cola War battles to his experience in the cof-
fee product category, where consumption had declined considerably, Keough tellingly 
revealed to Advertising Age,
Some coffee marketers forgot about advertising designed to reverse the trend. Instead they 
thought it would be smart to turn inside and begin feeding upon each other. They stopped 
selling universally appealing taste, aroma, flavor and enjoyment and started picking each 
other apart before the wondering eyes of the public. The results are well known. In 1960, 
coffee was far and away the nation’s favorite beverage. In 1976 coffee is just another liquid 
commodity struggling to hold on to third place.236
Included in this thematic concern about comparative advertising that failed to 
emphasize a salient benefit was the old problem of advertising that focused on a com-
petitor’s advertising. Copywriters Archie Anderson and Mitchell Koss, of ad agency 
Ross Roy Inc., stated this view in reference to the ongoing advertising wars between 
brands Avis and Hertz, and Tylenol and Bayer. As they argued,
Competition, though hardly the most elemental source of advertising is fine. The problem 
starts when the competition is between the products’ advertising, rather than the products 
themselves. . . . The danger is in defining your product by its relationship to its competition 
and that’s intellectual suicide. It’s incestuous, because it grows out of its concern with the 
competition rather than its potential for the consumer.237
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Degree of negativity. Somewhat surprisingly, especially given what seems to have been 
a substantial increase in the use of comparative advertising during this period, there 
were few recommendations regarding its proper execution beyond the nature of the 
claim. However, one of the most important themes to appear in the 1960s, along with 
the decline of “Brand X” and the increasing frequency of naming names, was the 
extent to which many advertisers viewed the tactic as representing a high degree of 
negativity and being synonymous with disparagement.
As the use of comparative advertising became more frequent during the 1960s, 
both advertisers and industry observers made scores of references to their belief that 
simply identifying a competitor was synonymous with disparagement. An anonymous 
ad agency executive captured this view:
There was once a sort of gentlemen’s agreement, an unwritten code among advertisers, that 
competitors’ names were not to be mentioned in ads, and that advertising would sell its 
products on its own merits and not by disparaging competitive products. . . . But this 
unwritten code is withering, and across-the-board comparisons are becoming respectable.238
Printers’ Ink attempted an explanation for the growing use of comparative advertis-
ing during the 1960s and, subsequently, provided a helpful historical explanation for 
why many advertisers believed that naming a competitor constituted disparagement. 
As the journal observed,
Since the brass-knuckle days of the early 1900’s that [the typical advertiser’s] conscience 
has always assumed that (1) name-naming and name-calling were synonymous, (2) no 
established advertiser would do either and (3) the problem was permanently hedged in 
anyway by law, code and custom.239
Many sources argued, as they did in previous periods, that naming names was 
excessively competitive and simply in bad taste. An anonymous author in Sales 
Management summarized this view: “Traditionally, it was considered bad taste, or 
even against the best interest of advertising, to name a competitor in your ads.”240
Two episodes during this period also offer some insight into what many advertisers 
of the period considered excessively negative—excessive competitiveness and bad 
taste. In the first episode, publishers of the Encyclopedia Britannica complained that 
rival Collier’s had unfairly disparaged their encyclopedia in a magazine ad with the 
headline, “How can all three [encyclopedias] be most used?” The ad’s copy claimed 
one could simply “watch the students” to answer the question. While the copy did not 
mention competitors by name, two of them, Britannica and Americana, were clearly 
identifiable in the visual. Britannica objected to their product being depicted without 
permission and to Collier’s implication that its books are “used more,” and also sent 
letters of complaint to all the magazines that had published the ad. One Grolier Inc. 
executive, publisher of Americana, tellingly noted that the company would take no 
further action because “Our feeling was that because of its negative nature the ad prob-
ably caused more hard feelings against Collier’s than it made sales.”241 Another 
Grolier executive pointedly referred to the ad as “in bad taste.”
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jmo.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Beard 163
The second episode occurred when McCall’s magazine ran an ad announcing its 
publishers would no longer charge extra for color printing. The publishers of competi-
tor Editor & Publisher opportunistically rushed to publish ads in the New York Herald 
Tribune and The New York Times, provocatively recommending that “previous color 
advertisers in McCall’s ‘should ask for a rebate.’”242 Herbert R. Mayes, president of 
McCall Corp., complained to both papers, calling the “knock” both “irresponsible” 
and “erroneous.” The subsequent apology, which the Times published as a full page, 
confirms the paper’s agreement regarding the “overly competitive nature” of the ad 
(see Figure 13).
The 1980s to 2010s
Many advertisers and industry observers throughout this final period confirm that the 
use of comparative advertising had become ubiquitous. Citing David Kerr, director 
advertising-marketing planning for automaker Renault, an Advertising Age author 
reported in 1985, “Mr. Kerr said up to the past few years the issue of comparative 
‘drew a lot of crossfire. Now it’s an accepted form.’”243 By the early-1990s, the televi-
sion networks had reduced their clearance staffs, but the number of comparative ads 
continued to grow. As one industry observer noted in 1990, “Comparative ads—
commercials that attack or mock competing products by name—have grown substan-
tially over the last few years, especially in competitive categories such as 
telecommunications, beverages and automobiles.”244 Referring to “TV’s early days” 
when most comparisons were made with “Brand X,” Advertising Age revealingly 
pointed out the following: “That had its limitations, to be sure, but it didn’t violate this 
old marketing adage: ‘Never mention a rival brand in your own ads.’ If there’s a rule 
for marketers today, it isn’t ‘never name a rival.’”245
Another Advertising Age contributor strongly suggested that the frequent use of 
comparative advertising continued into the twenty-first century. As she reported,
Perhaps it’s the tight economy and the idea that the way to grow in a recession is at the 
expense of your rivals; maybe the presidential candidates have set the tone for television 
advertising; or it could be the influence of those masterful and highly effective Mac vs. PC 
spots. Whatever the reasons, comparative ads—some of them pretty aggressive—are all the 
rage.246
Yet both advertisers and industry observers also strongly suggested that the tactic 
continued to be viewed as both controversial and risky, referencing many of the same 
concerns their predecessors did during earlier periods. Numerous sources, for instance, 
lamented the negativity and aggressiveness of this period’s comparative advertising. 
Political communication consultant Roger Ailes, famous for helping craft the contro-
versial “Willie Horton” attack ad for the 1988 presidential campaign of George H. W. 
Bush (with political communication consultant Larry McCarthy), told Advertising 
Age, “The product advertising world has taken over most of the negative advertising. 
Political advertising looks mild by comparison.”247 As the author of the piece tellingly 
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Figure 13. “The New York Times.”
Source: The New York Times, April 4, 1962, 85. The New York Times is a registered trademark of The 
New York Times Company.
concluded, “Even though top marketing executives frequently disavow the suitability 
or effectiveness of negative advertising, the deployment of this potent but risky 
weapon is definitely proliferating in American business.”248
Others also suggest this period’s comparative advertising was especially aggressive 
and that many advertisers continued to view it as somewhat unseemly, as this Adver-
tising Age writer did:
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For all the brand-slamming you’ll see in just a night of watching prime-time television, it’s 
not easy finding a marketer outside of the political arena who’ll confess to using negative 
advertising as a marketing tool. Asked if they practice that craft, they inevitably demur, and 
assure you that only political advertising practitioners do so.249
The aggressiveness and frequency of use of comparative advertising during this 
period helps explain why problems with lawsuits caused by it turned up in seventh 
place on a list of the top ten advertising legal issues for 2005.250 Indeed, as advertising 
wars among major competitors in product and service categories as varied as hot dogs, 
sports drinks, sunscreens, ready-to-eat soups, and cell phone services have demon-
strated, one of the greatest risks involved in comparative advertising continues to be 
the likelihood of a lawsuit, and increasingly during this period, countersuits.251
Direct Effects
Cognitive outcomes. The belief that comparative advertising greatly enhances attention 
and awareness was overwhelming during this period. Referring to a bout of compara-
tive advertising among business magazine publishers, Marianne Caponnetto, an asso-
ciate media director at agency Needham, Harper & Steers, told Advertising Age, “To 
go and knock your competitor is not always a positive way to do things, but it is often 
a way to get noticed.”252 The author of a piece in Advertising Age about a controversial 
Burger King comparative campaign cited statistics:
Burger King’s awareness soared 15.7 percentage points in October to 24.1% of all responses 
to a question asking consumers to identify the fast-food advertising that first came to mind. 
McDonald’s still led the category with 35.6% of all responses, but that was down 10 points 
from September and McDonald’s lowest score to date.253
J. C. Perkins, general manager of Chevrolet at the time, was the subject of an inter-
view about a comparative campaign for Chevrolet trucks. Asked whether he believed 
he had left himself open to the old criticism that the campaign was helping create 
awareness for the competitor, Perkins replied, “There is that possibility. But the truth 
is, and we have considerable data to back it up, the awareness for Chevrolet trucks has 
just leapfrogged. As a result, we believe in this advertising wave we’ve been on.”254
Moreover, toward the end of the period, some advertisers began mentioning a con-
nection that had not emerged previously—they proposed that the initiation of a lawsuit 
often enhanced the awareness created by a comparative campaign. After McDonald’s 
filed suit against Burger King five days before the company launched a compara-
tive campaign in 1984, Burger King executive Kyle T. Craig told Advertising Age, 
“McDonald’s did us a favor for which I will be forever grateful. . . . It created such 
tremendous consumer awareness that when the campaign broke it created even higher 
awareness and impact than we had ever dreamed.”255 And as an Advertising Age author 
similarly reported some twenty years later,
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Marketing experts were quick to criticize AT&T for taking legal action against Verizon’s 
“Map for That” ads. While AT&T wanted the ads pulled, what the lawsuit was more likely 
to do is bring attention to the ads, and AT&T’s weakness: its iPhone-taxed 3G network. A 
few weeks later and it looks like those experts were right. After having disappeared from the 
Viral Video Chart, Verizon’s “Map for That” ad is back on it, in the No. 7 spot with almost 
500,000 views.256
Although, as in other periods, a majority held the view that comparative advertising 
may capture attention, some continued to argue that it was the wrong kind of attention. 
Referring to the contentious and much-criticized comparative ad shown in Figure 14 
for magazine Business Week, which depicts The Wall Street Journal stuffed in a 
wastebasket, Young & Rubicam executive Joseph Ostrow argued that the ad might be 
engaging but would fail to be effective. As he told Advertising Age, “That sort of thing 
is not a way of doing battle that I think makes sense. . . . It doesn’t cause you to read 
the ad. It just catches your attention momentarily and then you move on.”257 Bruce 
Kushnick, president of New Networks Inc., a market research firm, similarly observed, 
“Watching the commercials where AT&T and MCI square off is the same as looking 
at a car wreck—you slow down to see the mess. But you don’t really pay attention to 
what’s going on.”258
The belief that comparative advertising could be informative was also widely held 
during this period. Also in reference to the Business Week ad in Figure 14, media 
director Marianne Caponnetto told Advertising Age, “It reminds us of the different 
strengths of the magazines.”259 Describing a comparative campaign for automotive 
brand Pontiac, Michael Wright, Pontiac’s advertising and consumer marketing man-
ager at the time, also summarized this view: “I think people see what we’re doing as 
informational and not necessarily an attack on anybody’s choice of vehicles.”260 
McCann-Erickson executive David Ramsey, responsible for General Motors advertis-
ing at the time, similarly argued, “Buyers are looking for more product information, 
comparisons. I like it when it is done fairly; when it is an honest-to-goodness free-for-
all. Where it is done right, it is extremely helpful. It makes good reading.”261
Moreover, advertisers offered increasingly specific insights into why they believed 
comparative advertising was often informative. Some linked this outcome to a prolif-
eration of similar products and brands. This belief was summarized well by Advertis-
ing Age columnist Sid Bernstein:
I have always considered the technique a useful one, definitely serving the interests of 
consumers, because comparing Product A with Brand B is essential in almost every buying 
decision—especially in an economy with endless numbers of look-alike, taste-alike, cost-
alike and perform-alike products.262
Others who argued in favor of the informativeness of comparative ads suggested 
that they were the most effective tactic for communicating a feature of similarity or 
difference. An example of the former occurred with a re-launch of the soft drink Pepsi 
Max in the United States in 2010. PepsiCo marketing executive Lauren Hobart, for 
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Figure 14. “It’s 10 a.m.”
Source: The New York Times, March 8, 1982, D12. Business Week is a registered trademark of  
Bloomberg L. P.
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example, told Advertising Age that the company revived comparative advertising from 
the mid-1990s to compare Coke Zero with Pepsi Max because “Not having diet on the 
can, the challenge is on us to communicate that it also has zero calories.”263 Conversely, 
referring to the decision to switch from a noncomparative campaign for beverage 
Sierra Mist Natural to a more aggressive one, comparing the soda with Sprite (“If 
you’re not fond of fake, try Sierra Mist Natural”), PepsiCo marketing executive 
Kristina Mangelsdorf told Advertising Age, “We found that they were not hard-hitting 
enough on the real point of difference in the product. People didn’t understand why it 
was different from other lemon-lime sodas.”264
As during earlier periods, a majority of advertisers acknowledged that explicit com-
parative ads often create attention and awareness for the competitor as well. Many, 
however, also offered additional insights into when creating awareness for a com-
petitor would likely become especially problematic. Advertising Age’s Sid Bernstein 
pointed to an overemphasis on competitors as a principal problem:
A more serious objection, from the standpoint of the advertiser, is the fact that comparisons 
cannot be made without mentioning the competitor; and there is at least an occasional 
advertiser who wonders if it is worth his while to spend any part of his promotional budget 
advertising his competitors. . . . Most of us can recall at least one personal selling situation 
in which too much talk about the competition has benefited the competitor at the expense of 
the talker.265
Moreover, in 2012, one source cited statistical proof. Immediately after General 
Motors ran an ad during the 2012 Super Bowl, in which Chevy Silverado owners 
lamented the loss of a friend, who failed to survive an apocalypse because he drove a 
Ford, a marketing analyst at Kelley Blue Book (KBB) confirmed that the Ford truck 
area on KBB’s website received more hits than the area devoted to Chevy.266
Others argued that creating problematic awareness for a competitor was more likely 
to occur if consumers lacked awareness about the comparison product or brand. 
Adman Herschell Gordon Lewis explained this view, in reference to the use of com-
parisons in direct-response advertising. As he wrote, “In years past, ‘cold list’ solicit-
ing seldom gave us confidence in any assumption that our target-readers understood 
our comparative claims against competitors. We were likely to open Pandora’s box 
giving free exposure to a rival.”267
Advertisers during this period made scores of references to the problem of com-
parative advertising confusion. An Advertising Age author summarized this view very 
early in the period and in reference to the frequently discussed war among electric 
shaver advertisers:
It has been suggested that the ad battle among the electrics over shaving closeness has 
confused and disgusted consumers with the whole category. The market leader, Norelco, 
which stuck to its strategy against wet shaving systems actually increased its share during 
and after the Remington-Schick dogfight.268
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Ad agency president Murray Raphel argued the same point, with this reference to 
an early comparative ad for pain reliever Excedrin: “The commercial mentioned a 
competitor and said why Excedrin was better. The only problem: Half the viewers 
remembered the competitor brand by name instead of Excedrin.”269 This view was 
summarized perfectly, however, in an Advertising Age opinion piece in 1999: “There 
have been great, informative campaigns built on this tactic, yet look where it’s taken 
us lately: a rampant trend in household products marketing toward not-very-informative, 
confusing ads that make a mockery of the potential benefit of comparisons.”270
Sources during this period also offered increasingly specific reasons for why and 
when consumers would be likely to be confused by a comparative ad or campaign: (1) 
They were unfamiliar with the target of the comparison,271 (2) the target of the com-
parison was a dissimilar product (e.g., a comparative Super Bowl ad that pitted Diet 
Coke against the sugared Pepsi flagship brand),272 (3) the ad lacked sufficient identifi-
cation for the sponsoring brand,273 (4) the decades-old problem with directly conflict-
ing claims in an ongoing advertising war,274 (5) consumers lacked knowledge to 
effectively counterargue with comparative claims based on often insufficient factual 
information (e.g., comparative ads for prescription drugs),275 and (6) ads, themselves, 
were too dense with information.276
Several sources pointed to a specific example of the problem of lack of brand iden-
tification in 2009. In the commercial, Verizon Communications Inc. targeted Apple’s 
iPhone with comparative ads for its new Android device, summarizing all the iPhone’s 
limitations with a series of “iDon’ts” (see Figure 15). Problems with the ad and its 
brand identification were described by Karl Barnhart, managing director and partner 
at CoreBrand, a brand strategy and communications firm: “There’s no summary about 
the product, and you don’t know who the brand is. . . . It’s clever, but you have no idea 
what this is for.”277
However, this was not the only point of view to find expression with regard to con-
fusion. Describing a comparative ad for First Jersey National Bank, the author of an 
article in Bank Advertising News explained that the campaign was actually created to 
eliminate confusion between the bank and similarly named but more widely known 
First Jersey Securities. As the author explained,
The rules of marketing positioning say don’t focus ads on the competition because they only 
serve to make the other folks better known. . . . That ad, designed to eliminate confusion over 
the names, clearly refers to First Jersey Securities, which has run a national campaign on 
television and has been the subject of in-depth articles.278
Believability. Perhaps because the use of comparative advertising had become so wide-
spread by this time, few sources directly addressed the believability of comparative 
ads. All those that did pointed to the inherent skepticism and likely counterargument 
created by the tactic, and moreover linked it to the believability of the claim itself. 
Direct-response advertising man Herschell Gordon Lewis captured this view 
perfectly:
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Figure 15. Verizon’s ‘iDon’t.”
Source: www.youtube.com. Droid is a registered trademark of Lucasfilm Ltd., used under license by 
Motorola, Inc.
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What we say about ourselves is self-digesting; what we say about others starts a battle, not 
only with competitors, who may not respond . . . but also with the reader, who does respond 
in ratio to two factors: 1) the amount of implicit skepticism, and 2) validation of our claim.279
Quoting Allen Adamson, managing director of agency Landor Associates, two 
Brandweek authors summarized this view twenty years later: “the approach is ‘not 
necessarily the best way to market a product’ for various reasons. One is consumer 
skepticism—viewers of such ads tend to conclude that the test is rigged somehow to 
show a positive result.”280 In reference to a Diet Pepsi ad showing entertainer Ray 
Charles taking a sip of Diet Coke and then apparently realizing it wasn’t Diet Pepsi, Al 
Ries, branding expert and coauthor of Positioning: The Battle for Your Mind, similarly 
argued,
It’s difficult for the ordinary person to tell the difference between Diet Pepsi and Diet Coke, 
and to pretend that Ray Charles can tell is ridiculous. . . . The consumer thinks he can tell the 
difference because he’s been paid a million to tell the difference. . . . It’s totally unbelievable.281
Affective outcomes. Similar to their contemporaries during earlier periods, advertisers 
questioned the likability of comparative ads, although the theme was not as prevalent. 
Moreover, and unlike the previous period, the mere identification of a competitor was 
never referenced as a cause of negative attitudes toward comparative ads. The belief 
that comparative ads cause negative attitudes was mentioned frequently by observers 
of a trend toward their use in the health care industry. Dick McDonald, a management 
officer at Milwaukee-based agency BVK/McDonald, a marketing and communica-
tions firm, told a writer for magazine Modern Healthcare: “I think negative advertis-
ing generates insecurity. You are raising issues that people don’t want, especially in 
healthcare.”282
Others linked negative attitudes to a frequently used tactic of the period, especially 
among auto marketers—across-class comparisons of a car model to a more expensive 
or prestigious “faux” competitor (i.e., a variation of the Twisting the Tiger’s Tail tac-
tic). Citing an auto industry survey conducted by consultancy CNW Marketing 
Research on the effectiveness of comparative television commercials comparing 
Nissan’s Altima to Mercedes-Benz and BMW models, CNW executive Art Spinella 
told Advertising Age, “People were offended with the comparison of Altima to 
Mercedes-Benz. . . . Prospects of both sexes and all ages fairly frequently said compar-
ing the two cars was like comparing apples to oranges.”283 The piece also cited John 
Slaven, founder of consultancy Slaven Marketing Services and a former auto-marketer 
ad director and agency executive: “When you reach too far, I think you destroy your 
credibility.”
The belief that comparative ads often reflect negatively on the sponsor was a fre-
quently discussed theme. Advertising agency president Adam Hanft told Advertis-
ing Age, in reference to an ongoing advertising war between long-distance carriers 
AT&T and MCI, “Our research shows consumers don’t want to be a pawn in the fight. 
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They feel the companies are not interested in them and only want to make a sale.”284 
Although Chevrolet’s J. C. Perkins affirmed his commitment to the comparative cam-
paign mentioned earlier, he tellingly told Advertising Age, “But if we had our choice, I 
would tell you we would always take the high road and deal with brand image.”285 The 
findings of an AdweekMedia/Harris Poll of consumers conducted in 2009 confirmed 
the potential for backlash:
Only 4% said they think less of the brand that’s attacked. Thirteen percent said they think 
less of both brands. Thirty-nine percent said they think less of the brand making the attack. 
And 44% said it doesn’t change their opinion of either brand.286
However, this was not the only point of view with regard to negative attitudes 
toward comparative ads or their sponsors. Eric Swartz, president of The Byline Group 
advertising agency, pointed to, once again, the Avis We Try Harder campaign as a 
successful example:
Consumers are impressed by a healthy dose of humility. Those companies claiming to have 
made it to the pinnacle don’t appear lean and hungry; they’re fat and happy. Companies that 
strive to achieve have pluck—and our undying admiration. Witness one of the most effective 
taglines in history: DDB’s “We try harder” for Avis.287
This belief was also reflected in comments by Massimo d’Amore, CEO of PepsiCo 
Beverages America, in reference to 2011’s version of the Cola Wars:
Hyper-competition is always good to sell more soda. Consumers love the cola wars. Since 
we launched the Max campaign, Max is growing triple digits and Coke Zero is still growing, 
so everybody wins when we get into the cola wars.288
The belief that comparative advertising causes especially negative attitudes among 
the users of the comparison brand was also prevalent during this period. Atlantic City 
ad agency president Murray Raphel summarized the view with this succinct warning: 
“You embarrass the customer. No one likes to be told he made a mistake.”289 John 
Goodchild, chief operations officer of ad agency Weightman Group, also spoke for 
many with this observation:
Even the lowest brand has fans who resent being ridiculed by a rival’s advertising. . . . But 
it’s just plain dumb to trash a brand in a mean-spirited fashion and offend the millions who 
know it and love it.290
In 1996, Anheuser–Busch (A-B) executives tellingly admitted to Advertising Age 
that their comparative campaign criticizing craft brewers, such as the Boston Beer 
Company, for the questionable quality of their beer “garnered a stronger response 
from A-B consumers than from the non-A-B consumers they were targeting.”291
Sources during this period offered additional insights into when backlash against 
the sponsor of a comparative ad might be more likely to occur. Conceding that 
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comparative advertising could be an effective short-term tactic, O&M executive vice 
president Graham Phillips told members of the AAAA that consumers did not object 
to “their product’s’ [sic] being knocked in comparisons, except where the product 
involved is a high-ticket item such as a car, where broader, emotional feelings were 
invested in the consumer’s purchase.”292 Some twenty years later, and in reference to 
the escalating comparative war between cell phone carriers Verizon and AT&T, Jer-
emy Toeman, a partner with marketing consultancy Stage Two Consulting, similarly 
told Advertising Age,
While people may prefer one brand of soup or drink to another, there’s a lot more at stake 
with mobile carriers. . . . [and] when consumers are seeing the carriers attack each other, 
there’s enough to get them to rally at a personal level.293
Despite the prevalent use of comparative advertising during this period, the belief 
that the tactic could lead to damage to all the competitors in a product category was 
frequently mentioned and shared by a majority. However, in each of these cases, 
sources referenced ongoing advertising wars as the cause of the problem. Rena Bartos, 
a senior vice president for agency J. Walter Thompson, summarized the views of 
many in her reference to what turned out to be Coca-Cola’s short-lived decision to 
withdraw from this period’s Cola Wars: “such strategies ‘erode confidence in both 
brands in the mind of the public and that both companies would ultimately carry the 
soft-drink market into a commodity category.’”294 McDonald’s Corp. president 
Michael Quinlan similarly admonished his competitors, in reference to the period’s 
ongoing Burger Wars: “If you’ve got good [product], flaunt it, but don’t tear down 
someone else. It’s not good for the industry as a whole, and I think we ought to stop.”295 
This view was captured best, however, by this veteran of the Spaghetti Sauce Wars: 
“At a certain point [Unilever] realized, hey, the category has declined every year for 
several years . . . and between [Unilever and Campbell], we’re spending $60 million a 
year to convince consumers that our spaghetti sauce is really crappy.”296
The belief that comparative advertising could lead to damage to advertising’s cred-
ibility as an institution was also evident during this period, although certainly not as 
prevalent as during earlier periods. However, this view was almost entirely linked to 
either potentially misleading comparisons that led to lawsuits or especially negative 
attack advertising. This point of view was effectively summarized by Ira Herbert, 
president of Coca-Cola’s North American soft-drink sector, who went public in late-
1990 to complain about the many questionable comparative claims that he thought 
were slipping past television network clearance staffs. As he told Advertising Age,
There’s a flaw in the system, and that allows—either purposely or by accident—for an 
advertiser to take advantage of the system, which could affect the credibility of advertising. 
. . . I am primarily concerned about the legitimacy of advertising and that if this is allowed 
to continue it is potentially a very serious situation.297
John Bissell, a managing partner of Gundersen Partners, a search/management con-
sulting firm in the marketing field, comparing comparative product advertising with 
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political attack ads, similarly observed, “Attack ads, whether for politicians or brands, 
are a blight on our national and business landscapes that all reasonable marketing 
professionals should strive to end.”298 And as an Adweek author strikingly opined with 
regard to the increasingly vicious war between pain relievers Tylenol and Advil,
But the main educational benefit of the Tylenol-Advil war has been to teach the public that 
you can’t believe anything you hear, that the world is unsafe, and that drug companies, 
behaving like cynical cutthroats, are no better than, well, politicians.299
The importance and occasional influence of channel members and other internal 
audiences was also a prevalent theme during this period. In a few cases, comparative 
manufacturer advertising created problems for dealers and merchandisers who sold 
both the sponsored and comparison products. What was also prevalent during this 
period, however, was a widely expressed belief that both channel members and inter-
nal audiences tended to favor aggressive comparative advertising campaigns. Mike 
Rawlings, president and CEO of DDB Needham Worldwide Dallas Group, perfectly 
captured this view:
It can be a huge power marketing tool that rallies and energizes an entire organization. . . . 
Send that smart comparative ad for your stain-resistant carpet to your international sales 
force. Throw them a party with themed favors. Just don’t put the ad on the air.300
Referring to a Burger King campaign that reignited the Burger Wars, a franchisee 
told Advertising Age, “This campaign is long overdue. . . . All of us believe our prod-
ucts are superior, and the research proves that consumers believe it, too.”301 Moreover, 
and much as they did in the 1920s, auto dealers frequently and loudly complained 
when manufacturer advertising was not aggressively comparative enough and even 
launched their own comparative campaigns to address the problem.302
Conative outcomes. Two prevalent themes were clearly evident among advertisers’ and 
industry observers’ statements and reports regarding comparative advertising’s direct 
effects on behavioral outcomes during this period. First, sources made scores of refer-
ences to the effectiveness of comparative campaigns for directly causing sales. The 
many examples began, appropriately enough, with an Advertising Age author’s his-
torical reference to the previous period’s most famous comparative campaign, Avis’s 
We Try Harder. As she reported, “The campaign provoked quite a bit of criticism, but 
by year’s end Avis reported a profit—a $1,200,000 net—for the first time in 15 
years.”303
Sources throughout this period attributed direct increases in sales to comparative 
campaigns on behalf of numerous products, including Taylor California wines304; 
Coors Extra Gold beer305; Prego spaghetti sauce306; Chrysler automobiles307; Royal 
Crown (RC) Cola308; Pontiac automobiles309; Anheuser–Busch Natural Light beer310; 
Miller Lite beer311; Apple computers312; Ford trucks313; Ford Edge, Fusion, and 
Expedition automobiles and SUVs314; DiGiorno frozen pizza315; Miller High Life 
beer316; Campbell’s Select Harvest soups317; Domino’s sandwiches318; Dish Network319; 
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and Sony Playstation PSP.320 Moreover, in almost every instance, sources cited 
industry sales and/or market share statistics as evidence of the effectiveness of the 
campaigns.
Although advertisers and industry observers offered only a few explanations for the 
effectiveness of these comparative campaigns, some explanatory themes are evident. 
Among the campaigns are two comparative tastes tests, three tactical switches from 
previously noncomparative to comparative campaigns, two strategic emphases on 
comparative value, and two new product launches.
A second conative outcome sources frequently mentioned during this period was 
the use of comparative advertising to initiate brand trial. In 1991, Coors Brewing con-
ducted a sixteen-market taste-test and purportedly found that 58% of beer drinkers 
preferred Coors Extra Gold to Budweiser. In his description of comparative advertis-
ing that featured this finding, Coors Extra Gold brand manager Gary Skovsted told 
Advertising Age, “We’re confident that the results of this survey will convince pre-
mium beer drinkers—specifically Bud drinkers—to try Extra Gold.”321 This point of 
view was similarly referenced by Paul Gordon, advertising and marketing manager for 
film marketer Konica, regarding his comparative campaign targeting competitor 
Kodak: “We have to initiate trial.”322 Trial was also stated as the objective for com-
parative advertising for Taco Bell’s Gordita (which was compared with Burger King’s 
Whopper)323 and Minute Maid Orange Juice.324
The beliefs that comparative advertising would fail to encourage sales, however, or 
even lead to damage to the sales of all competitors in a product category, were also 
prevalent during this period. But in almost every case, they were associated with ongo-
ing advertising wars. For instance, while Procter & Gamble’s (P&G) Scope was refer-
ring to Warner-Lambert’s Listerine as the brand that gives consumers “medicine 
breath,” and Listerine was derisively describing Scope as “the leading soda pop 
mouthwash,” a P&G executive was acknowledging that category sales had noticeably 
declined.325 Referring to comparative advertising that targeted prescription drugs 
Seldane and Alegra on behalf of Claritin, ad agency executive Lorraine Pastore tell-
ingly told Advertising Age that they would not respond: “That would damage the cat-
egory as a whole; it’s not a strategy we would be comfortable with.”326 This point of 
view was also explained especially well by Microsoft’s vice president of systems strat-
egy Jonathan Lazarus, in his reference to comparative advertising among software 
marketers: “So if I suddenly paint a competitor’s products as complicated, I’m overall 
feeding those arguments that things will be tough to deal with.”327
Perhaps this period’s most revealing episode occurred in 1993, however. Likening 
an aggressive comparative advertising war among personal computer marketers to the 
period’s Long-Distance Wars,328 computer maker Compaq’s director of marketing 
communications Jim Garrity felt strongly enough about the futility of the industry’s 
bout of comparative advertising to run the ad shown in Figure 16. Although the ad 
does not directly name competitor Dell, it does make the case directly to consumers 
that “Mudslinging, be it at a political candidate or a computer company, serves little 
purpose other than to muddy the waters.”
A similar episode occurred some fifteen years later. After what was an apparently 
successful launch of Select Harvest soups in 2008 with a comparative campaign 
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Figure 16. “Aggressive advertising.”
Source: The Wall Street Journal, May 19, 1993, 7. Compaq is a registered trademark of Compaq 
Trademark B. V.
(see  Figure 17 for an especially aggressive example), the war between Campbell 
Soup and General Mills grew even more negative. In late-2009, The New York Times 
reported that sales in the wet-soup product category had declined for four consecutive 
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Figure 17. “Made with MSG.”
Source: The New York Times, September 24, 2008, A15. Select Harvest is a registered trademark of CSC 
Brands, Inc.
Note: MSG = monosodium glutamate.
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quarters. Quoting James P. Othmer, author of Adland: Searching for the Meaning of 
Life on a Branded Planet, the Times offered the following explanation: “They’re 
navel-gazing and they’re not thinking about what consumers want to hear—they’re 
just talking at conference tables about how to strike back or how their integrity has 
been affected. . . . They get caught up in each other’s messages.”329
Situational Factors
Comparative advertisers and market share. Numerous sources during this final period 
mentioned their belief that comparative advertising works most effectively for smaller 
competitors, whether it was a new product launch, Riding the Coattails, Twisting the 
Tiger’s Tail, or a combination of these tactics. Such comparative campaigns were 
frequently referred to as “David versus Goliath” confrontations.330 An Adweek con-
tributor clearly revealed the longevity of this belief: “Letting loose, drawing blood or 
simply kicking dirt on the competition has long been a tactic for advertising underdogs 
in their quest for greater consumer awareness.”331
Bob Hirsch, a senior executive vice president with agency FCB/Leber Katz, cred-
ited one of the period’s most widely discussed comparative campaigns for the success-
ful launch of Prego spaghetti sauce. The campaign was also the focus of an unsuccessful 
three-year legal challenge by competitor Unilever/Van den Bergh Foods, marketer of 
the comparison brand, Ragu. As Hirsch told Advertising Age, regarding what was 
likely one of the most effective comparative campaigns of the twentieth century, 
“They had like a 50% share of the category in the 1980s and we had to find a way to 
show consumers we were better.”332 Figure 18 shows a key frame from one of the 
campaign’s most memorable and widely discussed commercials, all of which consis-
tently portrayed Ragu as thin and runny compared with thicker, slower-pouring Prego.
Sources during this period offered numerous insights into what they thought the 
advantages would be when using the Riding the Coattails tactic. One was simply to 
establish a product or brand as a legitimate member of a product or service category. 
Discussing a bout of comparative campaigns among business magazines Inc., Barron’s, 
Dun’s and Industry Week, a Forbes executive summarized this view:
This comparative advertising is not really new for us, but it is a change for some of the 
smaller publications. . . . To get a part of the action they have to become part of the field. It’s 
how the women’s books grew into a category.333
Trade journal BtoB in 2003 similarly expressed this belief:
For the No. 2s in a category, a comparative ad can be smart marketing. It allows the smaller 
player to place itself on the same pedestal as the market leader. Come decision-making time, 
the market leader and the challenger get mentioned in the same breath.334
Other sources also mentioned the effectiveness of comparative advertising when 
going up against competitors with significantly larger budgets. Kyle T. Craig, an 
executive vice president for Burger King, captured this view succinctly: “It can be an 
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extremely beneficial tactic, first, if your company is being tremendously outspent by 
the market leader.”335 Other advertisers mentioned simply comparing their products 
with larger competitors to take advantage of their popularity or because the competitor 
had established a product category. As Taco Bell’s chief marketing officer Vada Hill 
told Advertising Age, in reference to a campaign comparing the company’s Gordita 
Supreme to Burger King’s Whopper via a taste-test,
We’re not trying to say, “Don’t eat burgers.” Burger King was chosen for the taste test 
because “the Whopper is coming up as the product to beat” during focus groups and other 
marketing research. . . . We’re really kind of putting their Whopper on a pedestal.336
Michelin Tire Corp., in 1994, similarly compared its new rain tire with Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co.’s Aquatred because, as a vice president of brand marketing pointed 
out, “The (Aquatred) concept has such attention and notoriety brought to it, we felt 
that would be the most effective way to get our message across.”337
Arguably the most important and influential application of the Riding the Coat-
tails approach occurred during this period—the product “knock-off” trend. Adman 
Herschell Gordon Lewis offered this insightful description of the marketing 
phenomenon:
Figure 18. Prego.
Source: www.youtube.com. Prego is a registered trademark of CSC Brands, Inc.
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A sniff-alike perfume calls itself a “version” of Giorgio or Opium. An inexpensive watch 
used successfully as a premium has this descriptive line: “No, it isn’t the $2,000 museum 
watch—but your friends will think it is.” This type of comparison is, really, coattail-riding. 
The comparison gains credibility through association (or deliberate) confusion with a similar 
item whose position is admittedly superior.338
By 1987, more than two dozen firms were marketing copycat fragrances, and the 
knock-off trend had spread to other product categories, including, especially, fashion 
and personal care products. Among perfume industry advertisers and observers, the 
belief was almost unanimous that—while the knock-offs captured some sales from the 
more expensive, upscale competitors they compared themselves with—they stole 
most of their sales from the mid-priced, mass-market brands that were not the target of 
their comparisons. Indeed, the knock-offs did not even sell in the same retail outlets as 
the high-end brands. As an Advertising Age author reported at the time, “Other market 
observers agree that mass fragrances, not class fragrances, are being hurt by knock-
offs.”339 Even some fragrance industry executives, such as this one for upscale brand 
Oscar de la Renta, agreed, “Really, it has no effect on us at all. . . . Our customers don’t 
shop at K mart [sic].”340
Other upscale brands, such as Calvin Klein, however, resented the knock-offs and 
criticized these coattail riders for two reasons. One is that they viewed the exploitation 
of their brand names and registered trademarks as infringement. A second, which was 
explained by an attorney on behalf of Calvin Klein Cosmetics, was the concern that “a 
consumer who wants Obsession but first tries a copycat fragrance might never buy 
Obsession if the imitation is lower quality.”341 Calvin Klein sued, charging their prin-
cipal foe, knock-off marketer Parfums de Coeur, with trademark infringement and 
with deception of consumers by implying that its brands were connected with Calvin 
Klein. Although the trademark-infringement claim failed, a federal district court judge 
did enjoin Parfums de Coeur to place a sticker on the packaging of its “Confess” 
brand, with the following disclaimer: “Designer IMPOSTERS—Designer Quality 
Fragrances, Not Designer Prices—PARFUMS DE COEUR.”342
The Twisting the Tiger’s Tail approach, however, was mentioned far more fre-
quently during this period, with many sources referencing the importance of making a 
claim of superiority in comparison with much larger competitors. This point of view 
was summarized well by Burger King executive Kyle T. Craig, who told Advertising 
Age that, for a comparative campaign to be effective, “there should be a clear and 
meaningful difference that can be exploited.”343 Twisting the Tiger’s Tail was 
extremely prevalent in the automotive advertising of this period. Examples include 
Subaru comparing its models with Mercedes-Benz and Volvo,344 Ford comparing its 
Edge model with BMW and Lexus,345 and Chrysler comparing its LeBaron with BMW 
and Mercedes.346
Although there weren’t many highly publicized examples of a tiger actually turning 
to bite, competitive retaliation was often mentioned as a risk. Moreover, a Snapple 
Fruit & Juice Co. episode showed that it could happen. In 1989, Snapple ran a 
comparative ad in Atlanta, Georgia (hometown of Coca-Cola), showing a can of 
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Coca-Cola Classic and declaring Snapple to be “The realer thing.” Coca-Cola was not 
amused. The company not only accused Snapple of trademark infringement but also 
subpoenaed Snapple for proprietary company information in a completely unrelated 
legal case. As an Advertising Age author reported, “Snapple was ordered by an admin-
istrative law judge to show detailed documents—some dating as far back as 1975—of 
its business plans, including promotional expenses, expansion plans and other confi-
dential information.”347 Elaine Taylor-Gordon, president of Taylor-Gordon, Aarons, 
Snapple’s ad agency, complained to Advertising Age: “We used some gentle humor 
and went for a little nibble, and they [Coca-Cola] are going for our throat.”348
Sources during this period also offered numerous insights into why the majority 
believed it would be a bad idea for larger advertisers to respond to comparative attacks 
by smaller competitors or ever mention them at all. Ford truck advertising manager 
Bill Glick, citing proprietary research, told Advertising Age: “We’re told [in surveys] 
that when you’re a leader, you should talk like a leader.”349 Wine marketing executive 
Peter Sealey also seemed to speak for many with this observation: “Comparative ads 
are good when you’re new . . . but when you’re the standard, it just gives a lot of free 
publicity to your competitors.”350
Moreover, numerous advertisers specifically pointed to the danger of legitimizing 
a smaller competitor. The vice president–marketing for long-distance company MCI 
at the time, John Donoghue, claimed to be a direct beneficiary of this unintended out-
come: “By naming us, AT&T made this a two-horse race. . . . They are Goliath taking 
on David.”351 As another source confirmed, regarding the same campaign,
AT&T’s inclusion of MCI in its advertising, even though it’s negative, actually lends 
credibility and name-recognition to its rival. It is always a mistake for a market share leader 
to leave its pedestal, because doing so only builds awareness of lesser-known competitors. 352
A marketing professor at Northeastern University also spoke for many toward the 
end of the period: “If I’m bigger than you and run advertising because I’m better than 
you, a certain number of people who haven’t heard of the upstart learn about them.”353
This was not the only point of view to find expression during this period, however, 
as to whether larger advertisers should ever mention smaller competitors in their 
advertising. Direct-response advertiser Herschell Gordon Lewis, with his application 
of what he called The Law of Comparative Advertising, offered this tactical advice: “If 
you’re number two or smaller, attack a specific. If you’re number one, ridicule generic 
opposition, don’t single out or respond to one target.”354 On the other hand, some 
twenty years later, sources reported that cell phone provider Verizon was able to take 
advantage of consumer perceptions that second-place competitor AT&T was actually 
the leader, and, as one source noted, able “to come out with its map campaign without 
it feeling like a bully.”355 As Karl Barnhart, managing partner of branding firm 
CoreBrand, further explained, “In this case, because AT&T has the bigger brand, it 
didn’t feel like bashing. It felt like Verizon was just being honest.”
Another variation of the Twisting the Tiger’s Tail tactic that emerged during this 
period is best described as the “Good Guy, Bad Guy” scenario. Employed by 
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numerous typically small- to medium-sized banks, the Good Guy, Bad Guy scenario 
involved referring to larger competitors, some occasionally by name, as slow, imper-
sonal, stodgy members of a “banking bureaucracy,” unconcerned about customers 
and oblivious to their frustrations.356 Especially noteworthy about the campaigns was 
their sponsors’ willingness to openly acknowledge the banking industry’s frequently 
discussed problem with poor customer service. Quoting Robert Moss, president of 
Competitrack, a consulting company, Advertising Age reported, “It used to be that 
most banks wouldn’t discuss service problems publicly for fear of insulting their 
employees. . . . But now, banks are acknowledging the fact that service levels are ter-
rible. They’re becoming more honest.”357
An important point of view emerged as to the credibility of comparative claims on 
behalf of smaller brands, whether it was the Riding the Coattails or the Twisting the 
Tiger’s Tail approach. Some sources mentioned the concern that such claims would 
not be credible. Burger King’s Kyle T. Craig captured this view perfectly: “Your com-
pany must be of legitimate size to have credibility with the consumer.”358 Some twenty 
years later, Wes Brown, a partner with marketing consultancy Iceology, similarly 
observed that automaker Ford was “risking a credibility problem by comparing the 
Edge with BMW and Lexus.”359 Others, however, dismissed such concerns. Chrysler-
Plymouth advertising executive Mike Howe, with regard to advertising that compared 
Chrysler LeBaron to faux competitors BMW and Mercedes, captured this view:
We don’t think these ads will necessarily change the minds of people who have the 
wherewithal to spend $35,000 to $40,000 for a Mercedes or BMW. But we believe we can 
intercept the consumer who aspires to those cars, but who doesn’t have the money to buy 
them.360
Nature of the claim. As during previous periods, advertisers frequently referenced their 
belief that comparative advertising would most likely be effective if the product or 
service possessed a true feature of superiority. O&M’s executive vice president Gra-
ham Phillips summarized this point of view in a speech to the members of the AAAA: 
“Agencies and advertisers should consider comparative ads only when a brand has a 
clear and important functional performance advantage over a larger competitor that 
can be visually demonstrated or otherwise clearly explained in advertising.”361 Citing 
the company’s own proprietary research, Burger King spokesperson Joyce Meyers 
similarly explained to Advertising Age, “Consumers are saying, ‘If you think you do 
something better, don’t be afraid to say it.’”362 This faith in a true feature of superiority 
was probably captured best in this statement near the end of the period, attributed to 
industry observer Roger Entner, a senior vice president with research company Nielsen 
Telecom, with regard to a Verizon attack on the iPhone: “This strategy can work quite 
well if you have a device that is truly better than the iPhone. . . . As long as you can 
back it up. If not, you lose a lot of credibility.”363
Also during this period, advertisers continued to express their belief that the feature 
or selling point that was the focus of a comparative claim needed to be salient to con-
sumers. Joseph Ostrow, in his criticism of the Business Week ad shown in Figure 14, 
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captured this view: “The kind of comparative ads that are useful are those dealing with 
issues of substance: Editorial quality, price, performance.”364 In a lengthy piece 
devoted to this period’s Analgesic Wars, an Advertising Age contributor described the 
undesirable consequences of failing to focus on salient features. As she wrote, “The 
risks in opting for comparative advertising of relatively insignificant points seem to be 
those of creating total cynicism among consumers toward advertising, rendering it 
ineffective as a promotional tool.”365
Related to the importance of salience, numerous advertisers acknowledged how 
easy it was for comparative advertising to distract them from a proper focus on it. 
Burger King executive Kyle T. Craig seemed to speak for many, in reference to one 
of his comparative campaigns: “It’s very easy to get off track. You can get so caught 
up in competition that you forget the positioning.”366 Adman Herschell Gordon Lewis, 
however, offered the most direct warning:
Be certain your comparison caters to the reader’s question: “What’s in it for me?” Ignoring 
that last caution means you’re ignoring the reader. The biggest mistake marketers make 
when they compare their wares or services with a competitor’s is forgetting (or worse, 
ignoring) why they’re advertising in the first place.367
In reference to Figure 16’s Compaq ad, advertising executive Mike Massaro, of 
agency Goldberg Moser O’Neill, similarly told Advertising Age, “It’s like they’re talk-
ing to their navel. . . . They’re trying to make themselves feel good. . . . They’re trying 
to make the argument about advertising as opposed to about products.”368 This point 
of view was also captured perfectly toward the very end of the period. As AT&T’s 
senior vice president–brand marketing and advertising Esther Lee admitted to 
Advertising Age, regarding the battle over 3G coverage between her company and 
Verizon, “It’s dominated more our industry conversation than our consumer conversa-
tion. . . . It’s time to get past the competitive conversation and talk about what’s in it 
for the consumers.”369
Moreover, among the most widely held views, as it was during the previous period, 
was the believability of product demonstrations. O&M’s Graham Phillips summarized 
this belief: “Visual demonstrations of product superiority are viewed as objective and 
less prone to tampering . . . while taste preferences and ‘statistical arguments’ are dis-
counted.”370 Although there were no other widely held majority views among the 
sources, some recommendations for improving the believability of comparative ads 
included the use of charts, graphs, and tables to illustrate comparisons,371 fact-based 
claims substantiated by independent sources, and two-sided versus one-sided 
arguments.372
Ads are more creative. This period revealed numerous examples of comparative 
advertising campaigns based on opportunism. By this time, three types of opportuni-
ties were clearly apparent among the findings: (1) the exploitation of an uncontrol-
lable external event that affected a competitor in a negative way, (2) the discovery of 
a problem or limitation with a competitor’s product or service, or (3) the exploitation 
of some purposeful change in a competitor’s marketing strategy. One of the most 
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famous comparative ads of all time—Pepsi’s “The Other Guy Blinked”—is an obvi-
ous example of the third type. The ad ran in national newspapers on April 23, 1985, 
as Pepsi celebrated, and exploited, the opportunity created by its apparent victory in 
the Cola Wars, with Coco-Cola’s announcement of a reformulation of their flagship 
soda (see Figure 19). This was not the final chapter in this story, however. When 
Coca-Cola introduced Coke II (a new name for the “New Coke” reformulation) seven 
years later, the company did so with taste-tests and comparative advertising that 
claimed the following: “Real cola taste, plus the sweetness of Pepsi.”
During this period, one of the most widespread, and potentially destructive, 
instances of advertisers exploiting an external event with comparative advertising took 
place. As the savings and loan crisis of the late-1980s and early-1990s deepened, hun-
dreds of savings and loan associations (S&Ls) failed, and the federal government 
scrambled to draft bailout legislation. Numerous large, regional banks exploited the 
crisis with comparative advertising that questioned the financial solvency of their S&L 
competitors. An author for Credit Union Management confirms how widespread this 
trend actually was: “If the financial industry had its say, the 11th Commandment 
would be ‘Thou Shalt Not Criticize Each Other’s Banks and S&Ls in Public.’ And that 
commandment would have been broken just about as often as the other 10 
combined.”373
In a memo to the CEOs of 200 banking institutions, federal banking regula-
tor Michael Patriarca called on the banks to put a stop to the predatory comparative 
attacks. As he wrote,
Such ads, which are designed to undermine the public standing of other insured institutions, 
serve to increase the public’s concerns. . . . I believe this is an embarrassing and self-defeating 
spectacle and the last thing the thrift industry needs in a time of record deposit outflows.374
Another federal regulator similarly criticized the trend, arguing that “cannibalistic 
advertising not only hurts thrifts but banks as well. It generally erodes depositor con-
fidence, particularly in light of the difficulties.”375 Indeed, the federal government 
viewed the problems caused by this opportunistic comparative advertising so seriously 
the House of Representatives Banking Committee proposed an amendment to the ini-
tial legislation enacted to bail out the S&Ls, recommending that the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) adopt regulations forbidding the use of advertising that 
disparaged other savings institutions.
A similar exploitation of problems with financial solvency took place among per-
sonal computer marketers during the early-1990s. As described in Advertising Age, “A 
few major computer marketers have already noticed and are promoting their own 
health—while casting aspersions on the competition.”376 What makes this episode 
especially noteworthy, as well as somewhat ironic, is that among the PC makers run-
ning comparative ads implying some competitors were about to declare bankruptcy 
was Compaq Computer Corp., the advertiser responsible just a few months later for 
the ad shown in Figure 16, which declared the futility of such “mud-slinging” ads.
However, arguably the most striking historical example of comparative advertising 
that exploited an external event occurred in 1996. After a jury awarded Tylenol user 
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Figure 19. “To all Pepsi bottlers.”
Source: The New York Times, April 23, 1985, D7. Pepsi is a registered trademark of PEPSICO Inc.
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Antonio Benedi $8.8 million in a successful lawsuit against Johnson & Johnson for the 
failure of his liver, he published a letter in his hometown newspaper, The Washington 
Times, criticizing the company. Seizing on the opportunity, Advil manufacturer 
American Home Products obtained Benedi’s permission and republished the letter as 
a full-page ad in The New York Times.
Numerous other instances of comparative campaigns that creatively and opportu-
nistically exploited the discovery of a problem or limitation on behalf of a competitor 
or a purposeful change in marketing strategy also occurred in the financial industry. 
During this period, banks repeatedly employed comparative campaigns that criticized 
competitors for charging higher fees, paying lower savings interest rates, closing 
branches, or merging with other banks. One such banking executive summarized his 
motives clearly: “We were taking advantage of a fairly short-lived opportunity.”377 
Moreover, a Credit Union Management contributor confirmed that this exploitation 
was not limited to just the banks:
A group of Southern California credit unions is proud to let you know that they most 
emphatically do not invest in South American governments, junk bonds, Texas real estate or 
oil wells. And they are just as quick to let you know who does invest in all these economic 
no-nos: other financial institutions, specifically banks and S&Ls.378
Comparative campaigns that exploited a limitation or weakness of a competitor, 
based on a competitor’s marketing misstep, or failure to update or innovate its offer-
ings, were employed in numerous other industries and product categories. Examples 
include a campaign for Buick Century that targeted an aging Ford Taurus,379 BMW 
claims that the Lexus ES300 was nothing more than a “dressed up Toyota Camry” 
because the automaker addressed declining profitability at the time by sharing parts 
between the two models,380 Anheuser–Busch’s quality attack on Boston Beer Company 
for hiring regional brewers to brew Samuel Adams under contract,381 a Coca-Cola 
Vault soft-drink attack on Mountain Dew (“Don’t Dew It”) following an unpopular 
packaging redesign,382 comparative advertising on behalf of Ben & Jerry’s ice cream 
that criticized competitor Haagen-Dazs for reducing the size of its “pints” from sixteen 
to fourteen ounces,383 and Verizon’s attack on AT&T for its alleged spotty coverage 
and overtaxed network.384
An important creative trend to emerge during this period was the frequent discus-
sion of and reliance on the creative tactics of satire and parody. Many advertisers dur-
ing this period, for instance, employed satirical attacks on competitors’ brand images. 
Some especially notable examples include a European Pepsi commercial in which 
rapper M. C. Hammer loses his ability to rap and is only able to croon the 1974 pop 
song “Feelings” after accidentally drinking a Coke (Coca-Cola tried to sue);385 a Joe 
Camel campaign with the theme “Never Boring,” intended to portray the Marlboro 
cowboy as passé;386 a 1994 campaign for RC Co.’s regional soda Kick that claimed 
Mountain Dew was “wimpy”;387 a 1997 Procter & Gamble campaign for Millstone 
coffee, portraying Starbuck Coffee Co. as a good place to buy t-shirts and novelties;388 
and a 2011 campaign in which Pepsi portrays Coca-Cola’s iconic Santa Claus and 
polar bears disloyally preferring Pepsi.389
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Many of the satirical comparative campaigns reflected an important trend identified 
during earlier periods—a strategic decision to respond directly to a competitor’s 
advertising. Among these comparative campaigns and ads are several identifiable tac-
tics: (1) using a competitor’s actual ads in the advertiser’s comparative ads; (2) por-
traying a competitor’s employees in their recognizable uniforms, often consuming the 
comparative advertiser’s product; and (3) parodying a competitor’s brand name, slo-
gan, or advertising theme. An example of the second tactic is a 2007 Pizza Hut com-
mercial, showing Domino’s and Papa John’s delivery drivers—in uniform, and 
apparently on the job—eating pizza at the home of a Pizza Hut delivery driver. A 
stunning example of the third one occurred in 1994, when American Express ham-
mered home its comparative claim of lower interest charges with this parody of com-
petitor Visa’s slogan: “Visa. It’s everywhere you want to pay more interest charges.”390 
A similar and notable example occurred a year earlier, after President Bill Clinton 
mentioned that his favorite candy bar was Baby Ruth. Nestlé ran an ad with the follow-
ing copy: “When the new President said his favorite candy bar is Baby Ruth, nobody 
Snickered.”391
A sampling of other campaigns that parodied competitors’ slogans, message strate-
gies, and creative themes include a campaign for automaker Volvo that targeted BMW 
(“The ultimate driving machine, outdone by a Volvo”)392; GMC truck’s 2002 response 
to Dodge Ram’s “Mayor of Truckville” campaign (“If this is the mayor of Truckville, 
maybe it’s time for a recount”);393 a 2007 Microsoft ad that starts with a look-alike for 
actor John Hodgman, who plays the role of “PC” in Apple’s successful “Mac vs. PC” 
comparative campaign (“Hello. I’m a PC. And I’ve been made into a stereotype”)394; 
a 2009 billboard featuring a photo of Buick LaCrosse with the headline “Another thing 
for Lexus to relentlessly pursue”395; Verizon’s 2009 parody of Apple’s “There’s an 
App for That” with its own “There’s a Map for That”396; and T-Mobile USA’s 2011 
parody of the “Mac vs. PC” campaign, featuring an attractive young woman repeat-
edly putting down the iPhone.
Only a few explanations for the use of satire in comparative advertising were 
offered by sources during this period. One, however, was the belief that it was fresh 
and innovative. This point of view was summarized well in the comments of Tom 
Pirko, an executive with beverage consultant Bevmark Inc., with regard to a RC Co. 
campaign that satirized Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola and its patrons: “People are tired of 
the same old messages.”397 However, it was stated even more directly and insightfully 
by Ted Sann, chief creative officer with BBDO, who told Advertising Age that the 
beginning of the near-constant satirical give-and-take between Cola giants Pepsi and 
Coca-Cola could be traced to 1983, “when Pepsi was losing its edge in an advertising 
genre it had embraced. Lifestyle advertising was getting a little tired.”398
Degree of negativity. A majority of sources during this period expressed the belief that 
excessive negativity in comparative advertising was a bad idea. As Brock Luther, a 
Direct Marketing columnist, argued, “So how can you down your competition in a 
way that will pay off for you? You’ll make your sales letters much more believable 
and, as a result, powerful if you go easy with the bad-mouthing.”399 Referring to a 
spate of comparative advertising between Apple and Microsoft in 1992, agency 
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BBDO/LA’s Steve Hayden (a cocreator of Apple’s watershed 1984 comparative com-
mercial) tellingly told Advertising Age, “If the negative advertising is scary and 
manipulative, it’s a disaster for a brand.”400 Microsoft’s vice president of systems 
strategy Jonathan Lazarus offered a similar point of view: “I don’t think there’s ever 
been a study that shows that negative advertising sells products.”401 Bruce Cashbaugh, 
senior VP at Juhl Marketing Communications Inc., also seemed to speak for many: 
“When you throw dirt, you lose ground. . . . We don’t think it’s effective or desirable. 
If someone has to slam the competition, they probably don’t have much to say for 
themselves.”402
Moreover, Business Marketing helpfully summarized the findings of a 1992 poll of 
business-to-business marketing executives, conducted by Leo Shapiro & Associates. 
The poll showed that in most industries, “negative advertising was seen as a bad tactic, 
ineffective, with little potential reward, and the chosen response to a competitor’s 
negative ad would be promotion of good points or ignoring the attack.”403 However, it 
is important to point out that the poll also showed that younger marketing executives 
held significantly more favorable views toward negative advertising, would be much 
more likely to respond with attack advertising of their own, and had more favorable 
beliefs that negative advertising would encourage sales.
The belief that excessive negativity would be ineffective was also summarized well 
in an Advertising Age editorial about the comparative war between Pizza Hut and Papa 
John’s:
And so it goes. We can only imagine what the creative minds at Papa John’s marketing 
department will come up with as an advertising rejoinder now that Pizza Hut has raised the 
level of nastiness a notch—unless someone rediscovers that advertising must leave behind a 
positive feeling about the advertiser’s brand, not merely fire-bomb the opposition. Pizza 
Hut’s latest tactic is what we see all too often in political campaign ads.404
Indeed, the concern that the comparative advertising of this period was beginning 
to resemble the much-criticized negativity of political attack advertising was a preva-
lent theme. This belief was summarized especially well by Steve Center, American 
Honda Motor Co.’s vice president of marketing operations: “Brand building is better 
than trying to undermine the competition. And, of course, no one wants automotive 
advertising to slip into the slimy muck that has swallowed so much of today’s political 
advertising in the United States.”405
Sources during this period also offered some insights into what they believed con-
stituted excessive negativity in comparative advertising. One theme was that compara-
tive advertising would not be viewed as excessively negative if the claims it contained 
were true. This point of view was captured by Burger King president Jay Darling, when 
asked about McDonald’s Corp. president Michael Quinlan’s criticism that the ongoing 
Burger Wars were harmful for the fast food industry. As he told Advertising Age,
All we’ve done is talk about product. . . . Our Chicken Tenders ads say they’re real chicken 
cooked in vegetable shortening. I don’t think that damages the industry, just as I don’t think 
our “Broiling vs. frying” advertising damaged the industry.406
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Another episode suggests that the perception of excessive negativity might depend 
on the product category. When Fuji Photo Film USA ran comparative advertising that 
merely implied competitor Kodak was “old-fashioned,” and without even identifying 
Kodak by name, Advertising Age reported, “Industry experts agree the spot pushes the 
envelope in a field where ads usually feature warm and fuzzy images of children and 
families.”407
Another theme to emerge has to do with how to execute comparative advertising 
and avoid the consumer perception of excessive negativity. As direct-response adver-
tiser Herschell Gordon Lewis advocated,
If you write exhortational copy for a living, comparative claims are just about the strongest 
weapon you can wield. . . . Best of all created with professional delicacy, a comparison can 
build buying desire without damning another product or company.408
Referring to a comparative Pepsi ad that topped USA Today’s Ad Meter for the 
1994 Super Bowl, Pepsi executive Jeff Campbell told Advertising Age, “We have to 
be real careful with the competitive stuff . . . and not err on the side of being annoy-
ing.”409 The same executive told two other Advertising Age contributors, regarding 
another comparative Pepsi campaign, “If you’re too competitive it bums people 
out.”410 Agency president Adam Hanft proposed that the perception of excessive nega-
tivity could be avoided by not identifying a specific competitor. As he told Advertising 
Age, “Every commercial you do can be comparative. . . . The competition can be there 
in absentia.”411
Others pointed to the importance of tactical humor and, as some did in previous 
periods, maintaining a positive tone. As Ellen Koteff, the executive editor of Restau-
rant News, observed, with regard to the increasingly nasty comparative war between 
Pizza Hut and Papa John’s,
I can’t recall too many instances when mean-spirited comparative advertising scores points 
with me except, of course, when humor was involved. . . . Watching a playground fight is 
amusing for only so long, and after a while no one but the brawlers really cares or remembers 
who won.412
Dunkin Donuts chief branding officer Frances Allen also seemed to speak for many 
in her observation that “When you do comparison advertising it has to be fun and 
lighthearted.”413 Perhaps one of the most insightful observations, however, was offered 
by Apple’s Steve Jobs, in response to a question about the “Mac vs. PC” campaign: 
“The art of those commercials is not to be mean, but for the guys to like each other.”414
Finally, the importance of a positive tone to avoid perceptions of excessive negativ-
ity was also mentioned by many sources. This theme was insightfully summarized by 
Domino’s Pizza CEO David Brandon, in reference to a historically unique 2009 com-
mercial, broadcast during a spring 2009 episode of “American Idol.” During the com-
mercial, Brandon used a 450-degree pizza oven to torch a letter he received from an 
attorney representing Subway Sandwiches Company, demanding he cease running 
comparative ads featuring the results of a national taste-test that found Domino’s 
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sandwiches preferred over Subway’s. “So we poked a little fun, because we try not to 
take ourselves too seriously. However, we could never be mean or nasty.”415
Discussion
Many contemporary researchers on the topic of comparative advertising—such as 
Stanley Ulanoff, author of an early historical retrospective for the Marketing Science 
Institute416—have reported that it is a relatively recent phenomenon, and point to the 
FTC’s aggressive 1970s campaign to encourage it as a major transition point in its 
history. While the findings of this study show that the latter is no doubt a valid conclu-
sion, they also confirm what other recent historical studies have reported, and that is 
that both implied and explicit comparative advertising played important roles in the 
history of advertising throughout the twentieth century.
The findings confirm that comparative advertising was often a source of debate and 
controversy during the first half-century of modern advertising’s professional prac-
tice, and the flood of explicit comparative ads actually broke during the 1960s, a 
decade before the FTC’s initiative. Although some of this history’s primary and sec-
ondary sources consist of observations by industry pundits and trade journal editorials, 
the findings show that many of the twentieth century’s most influential business exec-
utives, advertising professionals, and industry opinion leaders participated in the 
ongoing debate over comparative advertising’s appropriateness, effectiveness, and 
ethicality. The full extent to which this debate occupied the advertising industry, and 
how deeply these issues reflected core principles of advertising practice, had not been 
reported in the literature prior to these findings.
There seems little doubt that the evolution of professional thought regarding the 
functions and attributes of effective advertising during the past 100 years had some 
influence on advertisers’ views toward comparative advertising. Some historians sug-
gest most advertisers at the turn of the last century favored a descriptive and emphati-
cally rational approach due in part to embarrassment over the frequently dishonest 
“bombast and ballyhoo” and patent medicine advertising of the nineteenth century.417 
This concern was quite evident among the early findings of this study. The announce-
ment advertising of the late-nineteenth century eventually gave way to the belief 
advertising should persuade, and the informative school of thought, or what is often 
called the “hard sell,” coexisted with the emotional and transformational “soft sell” 
throughout the twentieth century.418 Again, among this study’s early findings were the 
obvious concerns that comparative advertising would not sell because advertisers 
believed it did not sufficiently inform or that it often failed to be persuasive.
Yet this study’s findings offer substantially deeper insights beyond the influence of 
just professional, economic, or cultural context. The findings also highlight the goals 
and outcomes advertisers believed comparative advertising would be most effective 
for achieving and why. Moreover, while contemporary surveys of advertising profes-
sionals have shown that their beliefs regarding situational factors or moderators of 
comparative advertising effectiveness were quite consistent with the findings of schol-
arly research, the present findings also show that their beliefs regarding their effects on 
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advertising process outcomes are more consistent than some prior research had 
suggested.419
For instance, advertisers clearly believed just as strongly in the last period as in the 
first that comparative ads encourage high levels of attention and recall. Returning to 
Table 1’s model, scholarly researchers have concluded overwhelmingly that compara-
tive advertising, versus noncomparative advertising, has significantly greater effects 
on such related cognitive outcomes as ad attention, ad interest, message recall, and 
message processing.
Related to this finding, it is important to note that some advertisers clearly believed 
comparative advertising was effective early on because of its novelty but that this 
would likely decrease over time. Some contemporary researchers, such as Donald 
Jackson and his colleagues—who predicted more than thirty years ago that the “nov-
elty” of explicit comparisons would eventually wear out—have argued the same.420 
However, this study’s findings as well as surveys of contemporary creative profes-
sionals show that advertisers continue to believe comparative advertising is more 
effective than noncomparative advertising for achieving most cognitive outcomes. 
Some likely explanations for these beliefs include secondary exposure caused by law-
suits, secondary exposure and buzz via social media,421 and the fact that, despite the 
steady increase in their use during the second half of the twentieth century, compara-
tive ads in most media continue to be in the minority.
Yet, the findings also show that many advertising professionals throughout the past 
100 years believed that comparative advertising might encourage attention, but that it 
was the wrong kind of attention. Sources during every period mentioned that consum-
ers might stop and look, but then move on without processing the advertiser’s mes-
sage. Although it is not entirely clear what they thought the problem was—beyond 
Claude Hopkins’s apparent belief that comparative ads appeared “clownish”—there 
are at least a few other explanations for this belief: Comparative advertising often 
(1) failed to address itself to consumers, (2) addressed itself to competitors’ advertising 
instead, or (3) failed to focus on salient benefits or, in many cases, any benefits at all.
Many sources argued in favor of the informativeness of comparative advertising, 
and such beliefs are consistent with the findings reported in the scholarly research lit-
erature that it has a positive effect on message recall and processing. Sources during 
every period expressed the belief that comparative ads were informative because they 
often highlighted the differences between competitive products or services. However, 
the findings also support an important conclusion regarding when comparative adver-
tising will not be informative—many advertisers throughout the past 100 years 
acknowledged that comparative ads often cause confusion. Moreover, the findings 
also reveal that confusion is an important, multidimensional construct.
At the simplest level, comparative ads can cause confusion over which advertiser 
was actually the sponsor of the ad. This finding helps explain the consistent and widely 
held belief that comparative advertising creates awareness for competitors, and why 
brand-name recall is one of the few cognitive outcomes for which the findings of 
empirical research and surveys of advertising creatives remain somewhat contradic-
tory (see Table 1). There were also concerns, though, with regard to confusion caused 
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by the message. Confusing messages often occur as a consequence of advertising 
wars, when advertisers begin focusing their ads on each other’s messages and claims, 
and depart further and further from their own selling points, benefits, and positions. By 
the final period, the findings show that advertisers had identified numerous reasons 
why comparative ads can cause confusion, such as consumer lack of knowledge 
regarding the comparison brand or the old problem with directly conflicting claims. 
However, the most important would appear to be that comparative ads often lack suf-
ficient sponsor identification.
Table 1’s summary of the research literature shows that the effects of comparative 
ads, versus noncomparative ones, on claim and message believability are inconclu-
sive. The historical findings of this study are consistent with this conclusion. Although 
advertising professionals during nearly every period expressed the belief that com-
parative ads are more believable, and surveys of creative executives also show they 
believe comparative ads are more believable than noncomparative ones, the findings 
show that concerns about believability were prevalent during every period. In fact, 
beliefs regarding the believability of comparative advertising were overwhelmingly 
negative during the first two periods, although these beliefs were associated predomi-
nantly with knocking ads and the tactics of criticizing all competitors as inferior or 
their advertising dishonest.
The findings show that advertisers during almost every period recognized three 
important problems with believability: (1) Comparative ads are frequently not believ-
able, (2) they cause disbelief of all the advertising of the competitors in a particular 
product category, and (3) they reflect negatively on the veracity of advertising as an 
institution. However, it is also important to note that concerns about the effects of 
comparative advertising on the believability of all advertising peaked during the 1960s 
to 1970s, and then almost disappeared during the final period, suggesting an important 
change over time.
The findings also show that concerns about damage to the institutional veracity of 
advertising during the first three periods were substantially rooted in concerns about 
advertising’s unseemly past and the desire to advance the professionalism of its prac-
tice. Moreover, it also seems apparent that the major industry concerns related to 
advertising’s institutional status occurred concurrently with periods of rising consum-
erism and heightened public criticism, which were subsequently linked to calls for 
further government regulation of advertising. Historian Inger Stole has proposed that 
Americans witnessed the rise of three such influential consumer movements in the 
1900s, 1920s to 1930s, and 1960s,422 and researchers Fred Beard and Chad Nye 
reported that the peak periods of concerns and criticisms about comparative advertis-
ing among publishers and media owners also followed a similar chronological 
pattern.423
The findings support important conclusions regarding when advertisers believe a 
comparative ad will likely be less believable than a noncomparative one. First, adver-
tisers believe comparative ads will not be believable if competitors are making directly 
contradictory claims and, especially, if these occur as part of an ongoing advertising 
war. This finding is consistent with a recent historical study of advertising wars that 
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found that one of their main consequences is that they almost always lead to increas-
ingly exaggerated, and potentially misleading, claims.424 These concerns and beliefs 
about believability are also consistent with empirical research findings confirming that 
comparative advertising frequently causes counterargument and source derogation 
(see Table 1). The findings show that advertisers were concerned throughout the past 
100 years that the believability of comparative advertising would often be delimited 
by the inherent cynicism associated with comparative claims and the identification of 
a competitor.
The problems with believability of comparative advertising itself and the advertis-
ing of all the competitors in a product or service category are also linked to the prac-
tice, which emerged in the 1930s, of attacking a competitor’s advertising or responding 
directly to it. This finding is especially interesting because advertisers continue to 
attack each other’s advertising even today (e.g., AT&T’s widely criticized response to 
Verizon’s “There’s a Map for That,” starring actor Luke Wilson), despite the early and 
almost overwhelming belief that it was rarely, if ever, a good idea. In fact, this tactic 
became one of the standard means for exploiting an opportunity in a comparative way, 
especially with the prevalent use in the final period of satire and parody targeting com-
petitors’ employees, spokescharacters, slogans, and themes.
The findings show that many advertisers throughout much of the previous century 
believed that most consumers do not like comparative advertising and that it often 
encouraged negative attitudes toward their own ads and possibly their brands. Studies 
of both commercial comparative and political attack advertising also suggest that 
people do not like them very much.425 Indeed, only a few advertisers throughout the 
past century expressed the belief that consumers like comparative advertising. This is 
also obviously consistent with the findings reported in the scholarly research litera-
ture, which have shown that comparative ads do, on the average, have a negative 
effect on Aad.
Among the findings are several valuable insights into what advertising practitioners 
believe causes negative Aad, and findings also suggest they changed somewhat over 
time. During the first half of the century, advertisers frequently mentioned the belief 
that comparative advertising would be perceived as excessively competitive and in 
poor taste. During the 1970s, many argued that name-naming and name-calling were 
synonymous and would lead to negative attitudes. Yet, it is important to note that there 
was quite a bit of evidence during the 1970s—few viewer complaints to the television 
networks, few consumer complaints to advertisers, and the Tueros cigars poll—that 
suggests advertisers may have been projecting their own dislike of what they viewed 
as disparagement onto consumers. Beard and Nye similarly reported that there was 
little evidence that consumers complained much about comparative advertising to 
either early publishers or the television networks during the 1970s.426 Another impor-
tant finding with regard to Aad is that, by the final period, the mere identification of a 
competitor was never mentioned as a cause of negative attitudes. This likely occurred 
simply because by this time, as one source reported, “Brand X” comparisons had 
become much less frequent.
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These findings are also related to positive versus negative attitudes toward the 
advertiser and brand, or Abr, caused by comparative ads and campaigns. Advertisers 
recognized the potential for backlash throughout the past 100 years, especially among 
the users of the comparison product or service. This finding is consistent with empiri-
cal research findings supporting a negative effect of comparative advertising on brand 
loyalty and repeat purchase. It is also consistent with the overall conclusion from 
Beard’s 2011 survey that today’s creative executives have less confidence in the favor-
able effects of comparative advertising on positive branding, when compared with 
their peers from the 1980s. Moreover, sources during the final period also raised the 
interesting possibility that the potential for backlash might be affected somewhat by 
the nature of the product or service category in question (e.g., health care).
With regard to conative advertising outcomes, most advertisers during the first 
period believed comparative advertising would not have a positive effect on sales, 
although the Reach for a Lucky campaign was widely held to be a contributing factor 
to the brand’s sales success. As Table 1 shows, the empirical literature supports con-
clusions that comparative advertising is more effective than noncomparative advertis-
ing for achieving Pi and initial trial. There was a change in these beliefs over time, 
however, with sources during the first two periods rarely attributing sales effective-
ness to comparative ads. But by the 1960s and 1970s, many more frequently began 
referring to comparative campaigns that had positive effects on sales, and the final 
period revealed numerous examples of successful comparative campaigns, as well as 
examples of its more frequent use for initiating trial.
The findings also revealed some interesting and important dynamics regarding 
advertisers’ relationships with channel members. At the simplest level, some did not 
favor comparative campaigns simply because they happened to sell products manufac-
tured by both the comparative advertiser and the comparison brand. This problem first 
emerged in the Reach for a Lucky campaign, but then periodically throughout the 
twentieth century. On the other hand, some channel members—especially franchisees 
or other exclusive distributors of the advertised product—often favored aggressive 
comparative campaigns, and their influence on manufacturer advertising campaigns 
was revealed as significant. In some cases, they even created their own comparative 
ads and campaigns, when they wanted a more aggressive approach.
This issue has been almost entirely ignored in the academic research literature with 
a single exception. In 2009, researchers Greg Shaffer and Florian Zettelmeyer sought 
to develop a game-theory explanation for how channel members might influence an 
advertiser’s decision to use comparative versus noncomparative advertising and how 
negative the advertising might be. They concluded that an advertiser would be more 
likely to choose noncomparative advertising if the advertiser had the opportunity to 
implement in-store displays with retailers because it would only be desirable for retail-
ers to cooperate if the displays would increase their overall profits. And as they 
observe, this would only be the case “if the manufacturer’s advertising message is 
noncomparative or if the advertising message is comparative but its emphasis is not 
too negative about the manufacturer’s rival.”427
 at UNIV OF OKLAHOMA on January 20, 2016jmo.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Beard 195
Another interesting finding is that the use of comparative advertising for new prod-
ucts and brands, and the Riding the Coattails and Twisting the Tiger’s Tail tactics were 
rarely mentioned by advertisers prior to the 1960s and 1970s. By the final two periods, 
however, discussion and use of these approaches had become commonplace. The use 
of these tactics is, of course, entirely consistent with empirical research findings that 
comparative advertising is effective for achieving initial brand trial, and will be more 
effective for new brands and competitors with smaller market shares, and less effec-
tive for those with larger shares and those with high levels of brand loyalty.
Among the findings, however, are deep insights into when these conditions hold, or 
not, and why advertisers believe they do. The findings show that advertisers recog-
nized several strategic and tactical advantages to campaigns that compared new, less 
popular, or low-end products with well-known, often higher-priced competitors. For 
instance, advertisers of new products often favored the Riding the Coattails approach 
simply because it attracted attention, because it exploited the larger advertising expen-
ditures of leading brands, or because associating a product with a popular competitor 
was an effective means for quickly informing consumers about its features, uses, and 
benefits. Other tactical advantages are attitudinal and persuasive, such as establishing 
value or upgrading brand image. And it is also interesting to discover that there was a 
change over time with regard to this tactic. By the final period, it appears that Twisting 
the Tiger’s Tail had become much more common than mere coattail riding, and that 
many advertisers had come to believe that comparative campaigns targeting larger 
competitors should almost always include a differentiative claim of superiority.
Researchers have recently offered additional empirical and theoretical explanations 
for the effectiveness of these tactics. For instance, and based on the ELM and congruity 
theory, Joseph Priester and his colleagues started with the widely held assumption that 
consumers are more likely to elaborate on the claims in such comparative ads because 
the mere mention of a more familiar comparison brand causes greater perceptions of 
relevance, which in turn prompts increased elaboration. However, they concluded that 
the more dissimilar the sponsored and comparison brands are perceived to be, the 
greater will be the elaboration. As they summarize, “It is not the comparison per se that 
prompts elaboration, or the presence of a high-market share brand. Rather, it is the pres-
ence of relatively incongruent brands that leads to increased elaboration.”428
By the final period, there also emerged a point of difference as to the believability 
and/or credibility of the claims made by smaller advertisers in tail-twisting compara-
tive ads, especially those targeting much more prestigious faux competitors. Some 
sources clearly questioned whether such campaigns, frequently employed by automo-
tive advertisers during this period, would be believable. Moreover, one source cited an 
industry study conducted in 1998, which found some consumers were actually 
offended by such “apples to oranges” comparisons. This situational factor has received 
considerable recent empirical and theoretical attention. Researchers Stuart Van Auken 
and Arthur Adams carried out a series of studies on “across-class” comparative adver-
tising between 1998 and 2006. Basing their research on assimilation theory, they 
reported that comparative ads creating across-class associations with a leader in a 
more prestigious class but within the same product category, such as Chrysler’s 1998 
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comparison with BMW and Lexus, can increase the perceived value for the compara-
tive advertiser’s product. In addition, the development of such associations with a 
leader in a more prestigious class can also result in differentiation from within-class 
rivals.429
The findings do, however, reveal instances in which larger advertisers did target 
smaller competitors with their comparative advertising. For example, during the com-
puter industry contraction of the early-1990s, some manufacturers actually tried to use 
comparative advertising to kill off smaller, weaker competitors by exploiting their 
weaker financial conditions. This finding clearly suggests important advantages to 
comparative advertising that can occur in specific marketing situations. Still, the find-
ings offer consistent explanations for why advertisers throughout the past 100 years 
widely agreed that smaller competitors should be ignored—Attacking them is incon-
sistent with the preferred image for a brand leader (the “bully” effect), it creates aware-
ness for a lesser-known brand, and it can legitimize smaller or weaker competitors 
(i.e., pull them up on the pedestal with the leader).
The findings support some important conclusions regarding the nature of the claim, 
comparative advertising creativity, and degree of negativity. The summary of empiri-
cal research and survey findings shown in Table 1’s model shows that comparative 
advertising, on the average, will be more effective for products of high quality, and 
when claims are well substantiated, they focus on salient benefits and are believable. 
This study’s findings show that the majority of advertisers held these beliefs and there 
was very little change in them over time. However, the findings offer some insights 
into when and why these situational factors will have positive or negative effects and, 
more importantly, relationships among them.
With regard to the substantiation of claims made in comparative ads, little was 
mentioned during the first two periods. There was some favorable reference in the 
final two periods to the use of what Dhruv Grewal and his colleagues called “cred-
ibility enhancers”430—the use of credible sources, two-sided messages, or the sup-
port of claims with objective versus subjective information—although not a great 
deal. In addition, though, by the third and fourth periods, perhaps with the more 
frequent use of explicit comparative advertising, there emerged a definite prefer-
ence for substantiating claims with side-by-side product demonstrations, the more 
visual the better. Advertisers similarly had little to say about the relationship 
between comparative advertising and the salience of benefits, beyond the warning 
that it is easy for comparative ads to lose focus on them. The belief that this often 
occurs when advertisers begin addressing their ads to each other’s advertising 
emerged in the 1930s and remained consistently widespread throughout the remain-
ing periods.
One important belief regarding creativity in comparative advertising, and linked to 
the avoidance of negative attitudes toward both comparative ads and advertisers, that 
remained consistent throughout the past 100 years was the importance of maintaining 
a positive tone and of leaving consumers with pleasant brand associations. Of course, 
the findings also revealed numerous instances in which comparative advertisers appar-
ently found those to be difficult rules to follow.
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Other findings also show that creativity in comparative advertising is closely linked 
to advertisers’ beliefs about the degree of negativity in comparative ads, what advertis-
ers believed characterized it, and how these beliefs changed over time. Advertisers 
seemed to appreciate the importance of being competitive but also frequently talked 
about “hitting below the belt” and appearing to be “overly competitive” or “mean.” 
Some of these beliefs were consistently held throughout the more than 100 years rep-
resented by the data.
There are theoretical explanations for why criticizing a competitor’s product may 
be less risky for an advertiser, rather than disparaging their brand images—a tactic less 
likely to be perceived as especially mean-spirited or “nasty” by consumers. Citing 
Harold Kelley’s application of attribution theory, researchers Karen James and Paul 
Hensel argue that people are more influenced by information they obtain from some-
one else about a third entity if that information pertains to the entity’s factual perfor-
mance or actions.431 Other researchers have found that low-negativity comparative ads 
and those possessing fewer negative/derogatory references to competitors are per-
ceived more favorably by consumers,432 as are comparative ads of moderate “inten-
sity.”433 More important, both the quantitative and qualitative findings from Beard’s 
survey confirm that top creatives believe the effective execution of a comparative ad 
critically depends on its tone. The fact that advertisers often mentioned that excessive 
negativity was bad but frequently produced such ads anyway suggests an important 
managerial implication of this study’s findings—comparative ads should probably be 
tested more rigorously than just about any other type of ad.
Also with regard to creativity, the findings reveal the frequent use of humor begin-
ning in the second period and consistently thereafter, often with the belief that it would 
soften the perceived negativity of comparative advertising. The more frequent discus-
sion and apparent use of humorous parody and satire in the final period is a tactic that 
has been almost entirely ignored in the academic literature. Related tactics, such as the 
use of a competitor’s uniforms and, especially, the satirization and parody of a com-
petitor’s creative themes, slogans, and spokescharacters, were consistently used and 
linked to some tactical advantages, if not merely the capturing of attention. In some 
cases, the tactic was used to identify competitors without actually naming them. The 
use of humor in explicit comparative ads is also consistent with predictions of effec-
tiveness based on the ELM and the distraction hypothesis. In addition to leaving con-
sumers with a positive impression, the inclusion of satire or humorous parody could 
distract consumers from counterarguing with a comparative ad’s claims, leading to 
attitude change by way of the ELM’s peripheral route to persuasion.
Perhaps the most interesting finding related to comparative advertising creativity is 
its use to exploit opportunities. This is a practical advantage encouraging the use of 
comparative advertising, which emerged during the second period and that had never 
been examined in the scholarly literature. For instance, advertisers often used com-
parative advertising to exploit the discovery of a problem or limitation with a competi-
tors’ product or service. And although advertisers initially resisted the FTC’s efforts to 
encourage more comparative advertising in the 1970s, this likely led to exactly the 
kind of consumer benefit the FTC had in mind. On the other hand, although the 
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exploitation of uncontrollable events that affected competitors and some purposeful 
change in a competitor’s marketing strategy were frequent, and produced some his-
torically significant campaigns and ads, they were less likely to produce comparative 
advertising with the same kind of consumer benefit. Indeed, banks’ exploitation of the 
financial crisis of the 1980s and computer marketers’ exploitation of the technology 
slump in the 1990s offer some especially good examples.
It is also likely that the more frequent and tactical uses of comparative advertising 
in the United States were influenced during the second half of the twentieth century by 
changes in the law. First, there was the legal precedent that established the acceptable 
use of a competitor’s trademark, even on packaging and in comparative ads. This 
obviously made it much easier, and legally safer, to use explicit comparative advertis-
ing. Second, although sources did not mention it, an important change to the Lanham 
Trademark Act no doubt helps explain why comparative advertising more frequently 
led to the unintended consequence of a lawsuit during the final period. When advertis-
ers sue over comparative advertising, it is almost always under Section 43(a) of the 
Lanham Trademark Act. Prior to November 16, 1989, advertisers could only sue other 
advertisers for alleged false statements they made about their own products or ser-
vices. However, the Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 allowed one advertiser to 
sue another for comparative advertising that misrepresented the nature, characteristics, 
or qualities of the complainant’s product or service.
As a final, overall conclusion, it is interesting to note that every outcome and situ-
ational factor summarized in Table 1’s model was evident among the historical data 
and findings. This suggests that academic researchers over the years have often 
addressed research questions and topics of importance to advertising practitioners. In 
addition, though, it is helpful to point out what never got mentioned during approxi-
mately 110 years of professional debate over the topic. For instance, beyond users and 
nonusers of the comparison product or service, advertisers never discussed the target 
audiences most likely to respond favorably to comparative campaigns. Some research 
suggests that younger consumers as well as male consumers have more favorable atti-
tudes toward political attack advertising,434 yet age and gender were never mentioned. 
Moreover, some of the most recent research on commercial comparative advertising 
has confirmed that men and women not only process the ads differently but also 
respond differently with regard to Aad, Abr, and Pi.435 Other interesting and important 
situational factors that were rarely discussed include the use of comparative advertis-
ing in different media or its use for various types of products or services.
Limitations and Future Research Recommendations
The findings and conclusions of this study are, of course, limited in several ways. 
Some advertising historians, as well as some of this study’s sources, suggest that the 
use of frequently aggressive comparative advertising did occur during the nineteenth 
century. However, data collection was limited to the twentieth century and the first 
two decades of the twenty-first. As noted earlier, although the method is consistent 
with traditional and empirical historical research methods, it does lack strong evidence 
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for reliability and validity. This study is also limited by the sources used for the second 
two periods, mainly in that the beliefs and opinions of advertisers, although still often 
in their own words, inevitably became somewhat filtered by the trade journalists who 
interviewed them. Finally, the study is limited somewhat by its conceptual and histori-
cal focus on the “Americanization” of advertising, and by the exclusion of profes-
sional beliefs and historical practices in other countries and cultures. Historian Stefan 
Schwarzkoph suggests that this final limitation is one shared by many, if not most, of 
the advertising histories published between 1980 and 2010.436
The findings suggest several worthy topics for future research on some situational 
factors that are believed to moderate the effectiveness of comparative advertising. 
However, perhaps the most important, as suggested above, is the lack of attention paid 
to different product types. Rogers and Williams’s and Beard’s surveys are among few 
recent studies to offer any insight regarding the effectiveness of comparative advertis-
ing for different types of products (e.g., consumer durables vs. nondurables). Moreover, 
of the approximately fifty studies of comparative advertising published between 1998 
and 2012, only one examined the effects of product type or product attributes—
Carolyn White Nye and her colleague’s study of brand novelty.437 Indeed, a search of 
the literature and the references of Rogers and Williams’s article and Grewal and his 
colleagues’ meta-analysis revealed only two studies of the effectiveness of compara-
tive advertising for nonprofessional consumer services.438
Future historical research on comparative advertising could also helpfully replicate 
and extend this study’s findings by comparing them with works written by prominent 
advertising professionals, such as Charles Austin Bates, Earnest Elmo Calkins, Fairfax 
M. Cone, David Ogilvy, Rosser Reeves, and James Webb Young.439
Finally, both the quantitative and qualitative findings for this study confirm that top 
creatives believe the effectiveness of a comparative ad critically depends on its tactical 
execution and tone. Yet, sources only rarely discussed how to effectively execute a 
comparative ad in ways that would overcome the risks they so frequently pointed to. 
Moreover, negative consumer perceptions of the tone of a comparative ad could be an 
important reason why today’s advertising creatives believe such ads often conflict 
with positive branding.440 However, qualitative tone has rarely been examined, beyond 
a small handful of works that have focused on “negative” comparative advertising.441 
Future research could helpfully build on the findings of these studies to more fully 
explain when a comparative ad will likely be perceived as excessively negative or 
mean-spirited and more likely to encourage backlash, and how such perceptions might 
be moderated, as the findings here suggest, by the tactical use of humor.
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